Posted: March 11th, 2023

Module 4: Group Discussion (Collaborative Governance)

Module 4 through 7 has an associated group discussion that should focus on discussing the course content for that Module. Each discussion will span the two-weeks of the Module. Each student is required to make an initial post during the first week of the Module (i.e., the first Wednesday through Tuesday of the Module) and then respond to at least two (2) peer students’ initial posts during the second week of the Module (i.e., the second Wednesday through Tuesday of the Module). Initial posts should aim to be 200-400 words and while there is no range for peer response posts these should be substantive and include more thought than “I agree with your point” or “I said something similar in my post”. 

Use your own creativity in approaching the initial and response posts. Types of observations and reflections in the posts could include the following (but aren’t limited to this): 

• Pick a topic or concepts from required readings to reflect upon (e.g., what and why something interested you; what did you find the most interesting or practical that helped you gain new insight or skill). 
• Critique readings by adding something you can justify, showing how an author missed a point.  
• Validate something from the readings based on your own experience or other reading.  
• Include a discussion question for the group based on readings. DO NOT pose generic questions such as “What was your favorite part of the reading?” or similar questions. 
• Relate readings to contemporary events or news and post a link. 

IMG_6216

IMG_6217

IMG_6218

IMG_6219

IMG_6220

IMG_6221

IMG_6222

IMG_6223

IMG_6224

IMG_6225

IMG_6226

IMG_6227

IMG_6228

IMG_6229

IMG_6230

IMG_6231

IMG_6232

IMG_6233

IMG_6234

IMG_6235

IMG_6236

IMG_6237

IMG_6238

IMG_6239

IMG_6240

IMG_6241

IMG_6242

IMG_6243

IMG_6244

IMG_6245

IMG_6246

IMG_6247

IMG_6248

IMG_6249

IMG_6250

IMG_6251

IMG_6252

IMG_6253

IMG_6254

IMG_6255

IMG_6256

IMG_6257

IMG_6258

IMG_6259

IMG_6260

Jill M. Purdy is associate professor in the

Milgard School of Business at the University

of Washington Tacoma, where she also

serves as academic director of the Center

for Leadership and Social Responsibility.

Her research focuses on the intersection

of private enterprise, the public sector,

and society at large. Current research

projects examine social entrepreneurship

and the social practices of multinational

corporations internationally. She serves on

the editorial board of Negotiation and

Confl ict Management Research.

E-mail: jpurdy@uw.edu

A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Governance Processes 409

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 72, Iss. 3, pp. 409–417. © 2012 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.111/j.1540-6210.2012.02525.x.

Jill M. Purdy
University of Washington Tacoma

Th e growing use of collaborative methods of governance
raises concerns about the relative power of participants
in such processes and the potential for exclusion or
domination of some parties. Th is research off ers a
framework for assessing power that considers authority,
resources, and discursive legitimacy as sources of power
and considers the participants, the process design, and the
content of collaborative governance processes as arenas
for power use. A case study of a collaborative governance
process is presented and analyzed using the power
framework. Implications for the design of collaborative
governance processes are discussed, including the benefi ts
of a multidimensional defi nition of power, tools for
managing power imbalances among participants, and
strategies that participants can use to participate more
fully in collaborative governance processes.

State and federal agencies are using collaborative
processes so often that their use has become
institutionalized (Cheng 2006). Collaboration

describes “a process through which parties who see dif-
ferent aspects of a problem can constructively explore
their diff erences and search for solutions that go
beyond their own limited vision of what is possible”
(Gray 1989, 5). Collaborative governance processes
such as multistakeholder roundtables, dispute resolu-
tion processes, community advisory councils, and
regulatory negotiations bring together organizations
from the government, business, and nonprofi t sectors
to collaborate on problems of mutual concern. Th e
benefi ts of collaborative processes include greater
responsiveness to complex situations and more
deliberation than traditional governance processes
(Leach 2006). Collaborative governance may produce
more eff ective, effi cient, and fl exible policies (Sousa
and Klyza 2007) with greater public acceptability.

However, using collaboration to govern also has fl aws
and weaknesses. Gerlak and Heikkala describe “many
institutional and political obstacles to collaboration,
including confl icting agency goals and missions,
infl exible administrative and legal procedures, and
constrained fi nancial resources” (2005, 658). Th e

incomplete legal foundation for collaborative processes
raises questions about authority, transparency, and
accountability (Bingham 2009). Th e context of col-
laborative governance may not fairly balance private
interests and public authority (Sousa and Klyza 2007).
Critical interests may not be represented (Leach 2006),
and collaborative processes may bias decisions toward
the participants with greater resources. Finally, collabo-
ration can be a way of advancing self-interested goals
such as increasing power (Huxham and Vangen 2000).

Many of these concerns are linked to power dis-
parities among participating organizations and how
power aff ects such issues as representation, participa-
tion, and voice. Th is article off ers a framework for
assessing power and how power is used in collabora-
tive governance processes. Power is described along
multiple dimensions, including authority, resources,
and discursive legitimacy, and three arenas for power
use are considered here: the participants, the process
design, and the content of collaborative governance
processes. A case study off ers examples of how the
framework can be used to assess power. Th e article
concludes by discussing the implications of the power
framework for understanding and designing collabo-
rative governance processes, including how power
imbalances may be addressed.

Sources of Power and Arenas for Power Use
in Collaborative Governance
Collaboration occurs in the context of public manage-
ment when stakeholders work together with gov-
ernment to create new policies or to address public
problems. Authors refer to this variously as cross-sec-
tor collaboration (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006),
new governance (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary
2005), collaborative public management (O’Leary and
Bingham 2007), or collaborative governance (Carlson
2008). Th e term “collaborative governance” is used
in this article to refer to processes that seek to share
power in decision making with stakeholders in order
to develop shared recommendations for eff ective,
lasting solutions to public problems. Collaborative

A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative
Governance Processes

410 Public Administration Review • May | June 2012

interact in complex relational webs. Hardy and Phillips (1998)
propose three sources of power that are particularly useful for
understanding interorganizational dynamics: authority, resources,
and discursive legitimacy. Each of these sources of power is dis-
cussed here.

Authority is the socially acknowledged right to exercise judgment,
make a decision, or take action (Greenwald 2008). Authority is
determined by relative status within the institutional context in
which the participating parties are embedded. While authority may

be achieved coercively, most often it results
from social agreement to delegate power over
defi ned areas to a particular organization or
role. As Mary Parker Follett noted, the “true
state is utterly dependent upon us for its
appearance . . . we do not have a sovereign
state until we make one” (1918, 315). Th e
authority of a government agency to set and
enforce rules is accepted because citizens share

a belief in the “rationalization and the regulation of human activity
by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies” (Friedland and Alford 1991,
248). Th is bureaucratic logic permeates most collaborative govern-
ance processes because they are convened by governmental bodies,
resulting in a rational-legal interpretation of authority. Th e author-
ity of government is tied to its rights to establish and enforce rules,
while the authority of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
citizens stems from their right to participate in governance or to
pursue legal action.

While authority may appear to be an objective form of power, it can
shift over time as the social order is renegotiated. Th e negotiation
of authority can occur at the macro level through legislative and
judicial processes or at the micro level through group-level discus-
sion (Follett 1918). For collaborative governance processes, viewing
authority as malleable recognizes that participants with authority
can share it with others, for example, by committing to enact the
group’s recommendation rather than accepting it as advisory.

Th e “power over” perspective frames authority as a trump card that
dictates which participant ultimately gets to decide an issue. Th e
“power to” perspective suggests that authority is vital to the success
of collaboration—it “gives teeth to a collaborative eff ort” (Straus
2002, 40). Without authority, the shared problem or common goal
that brought participants together in a collaborative governance
process may not be solved or achieved even if the group reaches
consensus. From the “power for” perspective, authority also can be
used to sanction the participation of stakeholders who might other-
wise be marginalized. Empowering others through participation in
decisions “increases the total capacity for eff ective action rather than
increases domination” (Kanter 1977, 166).

Resource-based power recognizes the dependencies among organiza-
tions involved in collaboration and their ability to deploy resources.
Resources include tangibles such as fi nancial resources, people,
technology, and supplies; and intangibles such as knowledge,
culture, and capabilities. Resource power is distinct from authority;
for example, the information held by government agencies gives
them infl uence that extends beyond their authority to make rules
(Freeman and Langbein 2000). Organizations depend on human

governance is a cross-sector concept spanning the public, private,
nonprofi t, and citizen domains (Policy Consensus Initiative 2005).

Prior research identifi es two primary concerns about power in cross-
sector collaborations: convening stakeholders and managing power
imbalances (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006). First, adequate power
is needed to convene stakeholders, but government agencies often
act as both conveners and participants in collaborative processes,
raising questions about their ability to dominate such processes
(Broome 2002). Second, actors who are less powerful in terms of
resources, voice, or legitimacy may be ex-
cluded from collaborative processes or may be
co-opted by more dominant parties (O’Toole
and Meier 2004). Despite the importance
of such concerns, little theory exists to guide
conveners, participants, and researchers in
understanding

how power shapes collaborative
processes and outcomes.

Huxham and Vangen
note that “there is no coherent body of litera-
ture on power in collaborative settings” (2005, 174).

Analyzing power in collaborative processes is challenging because
they are ambiguous, complex contexts in which participants, social
structures, and processes can change rapidly (Huxham and Vangen
2000). Th eories addressing personal forms of power are inadequate
for understanding collaborative processes, while models emphasiz-
ing structural aspects of power are limited by their focus on a single
organizational context. To understand power in collaborative gov-
ernance processes, one must consider power’s political, economic,
and social aspects (Bierstedt 1950), as well as its structural, relation-
al, and cognitive aspects (Hardy and Phillips 1998). A framework
is needed that addresses the sources of power and the dynamics of
power so that we can understand both power attributes and how
relational power changes over time.

Conceptualizing power in terms of its sources implicitly assumes that
power is a resource that can be expanded, diminished, or trans-
ferred. However, a purely zero-sum, resource-based view of power is
inadequate for collaborative contexts. Power can be used to advance
the joint eff orts of the collaborators, resulting in mutual gain, or to
empower others to participate more eff ectively in the collaboration,
resulting in altruistic gain. Huxham and Vangen place the three
power orientations of own gain, mutual gain, and altruistic gain on a
continuum and label them “power over,” “power to,” and “power for”
(2005, 175). Concern for others’ interests is most likely to emerge
under conditions of good communication, trust, and shared goals
(Norris-Tirrell and Clay 2010), emphasizing that context and process
as well as resources play a role in determining power orientation.

Th e framework off ered here considers both the sources of power
held by collaborative governance participants and the arenas that
collaborative processes provide for the use of power. Th rough these
twin foci, the framework describes the kinds of power held by
participants in collaborative processes and reveals how power can be
exercised structurally and relationally in

collaborative processes.

Sources of Power: Authority, Resources, and Legitimacy
In collaborative governance processes, organizations and coalitions
with varying degrees of cohesiveness, resources, and political clout

[L]ittle theory exists to guide
conveners, participants, and
researchers in understanding

how power shapes collaborative
processes and outcomes.

A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Governance Processes 411

governance practice. To be authentic requires the use of appropriate
organization, methods, and tools; facilitative leadership; and delib-
erative space free of coercion” (Booher 2004, 44). Th e three essential
elements embedded in Booher’s defi nition of authentic collaborative
governance processes are the participants, the process design, and
the content. Each of these components provides opportunities for
the exercise of power.

Participants describe who is involved in a collaborative process and
who leads it. Vital participants in collaborative governance processes
are sponsors who identify an issue and initiate action, conveners
who gather diverse people to work on common problems, and a

neutral facilitator to negotiate interests, inte-
grate resources, and establish accountability
(Policy Consensus Initiative 2005). Partici-
pants should include those with formal power
to make a decision, those who can block a de-
cision, those aff ected by a decision, and those
with relevant information or expertise (Straus
2002). Participation is often determined by
leaders whose interpretation of the situation

determines which stakeholders are invited to collaborate and which
are excluded. Fung (2006) notes that the degree of democracy in a
collaborative process can be determined in part by who is invited to
participate. However, issues of participation extend beyond who is
invited. Collaborative governance processes are voluntary, so some
invited parties may choose not to participate because of mistrust
of collaborative processes or a preference to address the situation
through alternative means. Th ose who do participate vary in experi-
ence and eff ectiveness with such processes.

While many studies of collaborative governance exist, public
administration research has not looked closely at process design for
collaboration (Bingham 2009). Process design describes the where,
when, and how of collaborative governance, infl uencing the nature
of interaction and the modes that are used for communication and
decision making. Processes for collaborative governance must be
designed with fl exibility to allow trial and error without creating
ambiguity and confusion (Straus 2002), but the decision making
of process design occurs before the actual content of the collabora-
tion occurs. Process design determines whether participants feel
fairly treated, and these perceptions of procedural justice infl uence
satisfaction with the outcomes of the process (Brockner and Siegel
1996). Process design also helps convey status within a group,
signaling who holds a leadership role and whether participants are
equal.

A third arena for the exercise of power is the content of the col-
laboration, or what issues are addressed and what outcomes are
pursued. Deciding the scope of the issues is an important oppor-
tunity for the use of power (Altheide 1988). Th e content of initial
agreements in a collaboration aff ects the outcomes of the process
(Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006), and the interpretations that
people use to identify issues and understand alternatives are closely
linked to the success of the process (Gray 2004). Finally, decisions
about the content of a collaborative process determine who has a
legitimate claim to participate in the process and how the proc-
ess will unfold (Gray 1989), linking content-related power use to
participants and process design.

resources to represent them in collaborative governance proc-
esses, while information and knowledge resources are needed to
comprehend and analyze the issues. Financial resources can allow
organizations to gain expert advice or representation in collaborative
processes, increasing their infl uence. In addition to using resources
for their own benefi t, organizations can use resources to infl uence
other participants in collaborative processes by rewarding them
for support or compliance or by punishing them for dissension or
noncompliance.

In collaborative contexts, the relational and perceptual aspects of
power may be as important as the objective ability to command
resources. For example, those with fi nancial
resources often behave as if they hold power,
while those lacking them typically feel disem-
powered, even if they have alternative sources
of power available (Huxham and Vangen
2005). Similarly, “people who are thought to
have power already . . . who look like they can
command more of the organization’s resources
. . . may also be more infl uential and more
eff ective in getting the people around them to do things and feel
satisfi ed about it” (Kanter 1977, 168–69).

Discursive legitimacy refers to the ability of an organization to repre-
sent a discourse or speak on behalf of an issue in the public sphere
(Hardy and Phillips 1998). Organizations exercise discursive legiti-
macy when they act on behalf of the values or norms of a society,
such as the rule of law, the logic of economic rationality, or principles
such as democracy or respect for diverse cultures. An organization
with discursive legitimacy draws its power from the status of the val-
ues or logic it represents. Th is form of power acknowledges that “in-
terorganizational power relations cannot be fully understood without
attention to the larger pattern of societal dominance” (Benson 1975,
233). Participants who lack authority or resources can exert power if
they are perceived to speak on behalf of a societally important ideal,
such as ecological preservation or racial equality.

Some parties have discursive power based upon the discourse
that is rooted in society. Put simply, this means that power is
attributed to them because of the way we, collectively, talk about
them in relation to others. (Huxham and Vangen 2005, 176)

A participant in collaborative governance may represent relatively
low status people within a society, such as immigrants, but may
exert power by linking to a societal value, such as acceptance of
diversity. Th is type of discursive power is strongest when the value
represented is widely shared and the organization’s claim of repre-
sentation for it is relatively uncontested.

Discursive power also stems from the ability to manage meaning
by infl uencing how information is presented. Th is is particularly
important in collaborative contexts because parties in collaboration
are engaged in complex negotiations around developing common
meanings and mutual identities (Huxham and Vangen 2005).

Arenas for Power: Participants, Process, and Content
While collaborative processes are widely used in government, “not
every process calling itself collaborative is an authentic collaborative

In collaborative contexts, the
relational and perceptual aspects
of power may be as important

as the objective ability to
command resources.

412 Public Administration Review • May | June 2012

including meeting frequency and formality. Th e right to design col-
laborative processes is linked to authority. Th e structure of public sector
collaborations may be imposed by a host organization (Huxham and
Vangen 2000); however, process design can also be a collaborative proc-
ess (O’Toole and Meier 2004). An organization with authority may
challenge deep structure notions about power by sharing its power to
design the process. Once a process has been designed, the type and du-
ration of interactions determine opportunities for participation and for
the use of power (Sharfman, Gray, and Yan 1991). Processes can limit
participants to listening as spectators, or they can enable participants
to deliberate and negotiate (Fung 2006). Resources may infl uence such
process factors as meeting frequency, meeting location(s), and options
for participating in person, by telephone, or by videoconference. Th e
costs of hosting and participating in collaborative processes, such as
travel, lost work time, meeting space, note taking, and communication,
are also linked to the availability of resources. Discursive legitimacy
aff ects the modes and frequency of expression during meetings. Greater
discursive legitimacy can lead to domineering behavior and one-way
fl ows of information, or it can be used to perform a gatekeeping func-
tion that ensures equitable participation from all parties. In the deep
structure, discursive legitimacy aff ects how participants communicate
about the process to each other and to their constituents.

In the content arena, authority allows an organization to set the
agenda and establish other participants’ expectations regarding the
outcome of the process. Other participants may draw on indirect
sources of authority such as legal rights to shape the topics or scope
of discussion. Resources provide organizations with the ability to
collect, share, and interpret information about the issues and topics
under discussion. For example, an organization with the capability
of producing meeting records can control the scope and depth of
documentation, which might infl uence future meetings. Discursive
legitimacy can infl uence the prioritization of issues as participants
assert the dominance of one issue or perspective over another. In
the deep structure, discursive legitimacy operates by infl uencing
the framing of issues. Frames are lenses that people use to interpret
information and make sense of a situation (Gray 2004). Participants
come to the process with cognitive frames that defi ne what the issues
mean to them, then engage in interactive issue framing to construct a
shared meaning through dialogue (Dewulf et al. 2009). Power can be
used to promote certain outcomes by imposing particular frames, or
it can be used to prevent the discovery of common frames and shared
meanings. Collaborative initiatives can be derailed if participants are
unable to understand each others’ frames (Gray 2004).

Th e framework presented here allows assessment of the power
sources of participants to a collaborative process, how power can be

Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative
Governance Processes
A framework for assessing power in collaborative governance
processes can be created by juxtaposing the three sources of power
with the three arenas for power described earlier. Th e framework,
shown in table 1, describes how authority, resources, and discursive
legitimacy can be used to infl uence the participants, process design,
and content of a collaborative process. Th is framework goes beyond
rights-based approaches to power to allow a more nuanced investi-
gation of power and its use in collaborative governance processes.

Th e framework acknowledges that collaborative processes are not
objective, predetermined structures but are themselves imbued with
interests and power (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Power can be
visible on the surface of interactions as overt infl uence attempts, but
it also can be deployed more subtly to frame conversations and to
promote or marginalize participants’ voices. Frost (1989) describes
such eff orts to shape perceptions of social reality as “using power in
the deep structure.” Th e deep structure is a shared system of mean-
ing that operates in the collective unconscious of actors (Frost 1989;
Hardy 1994). Deep structure uses of power attempt to reinforce or
change taken-for-granted roles, structures, and modes of interaction
(Everett and Jamal 2004; Frost 1989). Th e framework includes both
surface uses of power, such as the inclusion of a particular stake-
holder in a collaborative process, and deep structure uses of power,
such as the language used to present issues for discussion.

In the participation arena, authority can be used to determine who is
invited to participate and how broadly participation extends. More
inclusive processes invite open public participation or self-selection,
while less inclusive processes rely on the participation of elected
offi cials or expert administrators (Fung 2006). However, merely
constructing an open, inclusive process may not ensure that invitees
participate. Resources may infl uence the number able to partici-
pate and how well-informed or expert participants are. In the deep
structure, power can be used to infl uence the degree to which people
engage in the collaborative process. Discursive legitimacy can aff ect
the status of representatives and their ability to participate. Partici-
pants need to believe that they deserve a seat at the table (Hardy and
Phillips 1998) and must be trusted to make commitments on behalf
of their organizations to participate fully (Leach 2006). On the other
hand, participants representing coalitions or collaborative networks
may participate more vigorously because they represent the collective
power of a group (Butterfi eld, Reed, and Lemak 2004).

In the process design arena, authority shapes beliefs about who owns
the process and expectations about how the collaboration will proceed,

Table 1 Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Processes

ARENAS FOR POWER

Formal Authority Resources Discursive Legitimacy

PROCESS
ELEMENTS

Participants Selection of participants
Limits on participants

Number of representatives
Expertise of representatives

Status of representatives
Use of coalitions

Process
Design

Ownership of the process
Interaction expectations for the process
Number, length, and location of meetings

How the process is paid for Frequency of voice
Methods of voice
Communication about the process

Content Setting the agenda
Outcome expectations for the process
Use of indirect authority such as legal rights

Distribution of information
Understanding and analyzing the issues
Production of meeting records

Prioritization of issues
Framing of the issues to be addressed

A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Governance Processes 413

state, and tribal governments and demonstrate that the project
operates in the public interest. Th e process for licensing a dam
required owners to commission scientifi c studies and fi le a license
application. Public input consisted of a three-month comment pe-
riod, and FERC often required additional studies or changes to the
application. Th e licensing process typically took at least fi ve years,
and the cost could reach $10 million (Swiger and Burns 1998).
Owners saw the process as adversarial and burdensome (National
Hydropower Association 1999), and other stakeholders had few
opportunities for input.

FERC revised the process in late 1997 so that regulatory agencies
were involved from the beginning and NGOs and the public could
participate more fully in environmental impact assessment. Th is
alternative process sped up licensing by about one year (Andersen
2000), but stakeholders continued to demand a complete overhaul
of the hydroelectric licensing process (Swiger and Grant 2004).
In 2001, FERC formed the Interagency Hydropower Commit-
tee (IHC) in partnership with other federal agencies to design a
new licensing process. Simultaneously, a coalition of owners and
conservation groups formed the National Review Group (NRG) to
develop their own recommendations for licensing.

The Collaborative Process
FERC’s collaborative process in 2002–3 included 25 public meet-
ings over a period of eight months. About half of the meetings were
designated primarily for Native American tribes to provide input.
Attendance at the meetings ranged from one person to more than
60 people. Some 155 diff erent organizations and seven coalitions
participated representing the six primary stakeholders: FERC, own-
ers, federal agencies, state agencies, tribes, and NGOs.

Th e key interests of each group of stakeholders were as follows:
FERC sought input from a range of stakeholders while retaining
its role as the dominant authority in the process. Owners sought to
speed up the licensing process so as to limit the authority of some
agencies to impose restrictions on the license, and to have a choice
of licensing processes. Federal agencies sought to retain their author-
ity to solicit information and to place restrictions upon licenses.
State agencies wanted recognition of their authority to impose
restrictions on licenses. Native American tribes sought recognition
of their status as sovereign nations and of their licensing authority.
Th ey were also concerned that a shorter licensing process would lim-
it their ability to exercise their rights given limited resources. NGOs
sought a single process that would make it easier for organizations
with limited resources to participate in licensing. Th ey wanted the
process to gain speed, but not at the expense of thoroughness.

FERC’s fi nal rule, issued in 2003, created a single licensing process
that allowed more coordination between stakeholders and increased
opportunities for public participation and consultation. Th e changes
made the licensing process more effi cient without altering the au-
thority to protect fi sh, national forests, Native American reservations,
or rivers. FERC anticipated that the integrated licensing process
would shorten the average licensing time and reduce licensing costs
by about 30 percent. FERC also affi rmed the sovereignty of federally
recognized tribes and appointed a liaison to support tribal participa-
tion in licensing processes. Assessments of the collaborative process
were largely positive. A hydropower industry newsletter noted that

used by parties during a process, and how the design of the collabo-
rative process shapes the exercise of power. To illustrate the frame-
work’s potential, a case study of a collaborative process is presented
and analyzed using the power framework.

Case Methodology
In 2002, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
used a collaborative governance process to redesign the rules for
licensing hydroelectric dams, a multiyear process that typically
involves dozens of studies, agencies, stakeholders, and decisions for
each dam. In partnership with the U.S. Departments of Agricul-
ture, Commerce, and the Interior, FERC sponsored a nationwide
collaborative governance process that included 25 public meetings
over a period of eight months. Th e process began with 11 forums
held throughout the United States in October and November 2002,
followed by a stakeholder meeting and drafting session held in
December in Washington, D.C. FERC issued its proposal for a new
licensing process in February 2003. Eleven more forums around
the United States were held in March and April 2003, followed
by another drafting session in May. FERC issued its new rules for
hydroelectric licensing in July 2003.

Th e author attended one public forum and one tribal forum in
November 2002 and obtained transcripts of all 25 meetings and
drafting sessions from FERC. Interviews were conducted with three
hydroelectric project owners, one NGO representative, one tribal
representative, and two FERC representatives in 2002 and 2003 to
gather additional information about FERC’s collaborative proc-
ess. Information about the collaborative governance process was
collected from the publications and Web sites of industry associa-
tions such as the National Hydropower Association, nongovern-
mental organizations such as American Rivers, and federal agencies.
Additional information about the U.S. hydroelectric licensing proc-
ess was gathered from secondary sources, including FERC docu-
ments, peer-reviewed publications, and congressional hearings.

Data were analyzed in two stages. Th e fi rst stage of data analysis
involved constructing a detailed timeline of events related to the
collaboration from 1997 to 2003 (Marshall and Rossman 1989).
Beginning the timeline in 1997 allowed the identifi cation of
potential stakeholders and provided historical context for under-
standing the collaborative process. Th e second stage of data analysis
focused on content analysis of the transcripts of the seven interviews
and 25 public meetings sponsored by FERC. Transcripts were
analyzed using NVivo software according to guidelines for theory-
based content analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994). Initial coding
involved categorizing participants, process references, and content
issues. A second pass through the data was used to code speech turns
based on references to authority, resources, and discursive legitima-
cy. Following initial coding, subcategories were inductively created
within the discursive legitimacy category to account for diff erences
among stakeholders in sources of discursive legitimacy. Th e data
were then sorted and transferred to a spreadsheet in order to create a
matrix based on the constructs shown in table 1.

Case Study: Redesigning Hydroelectric Licensing
In the United States, hydroelectric licenses are issued by FERC
for periods of 30 to 50 years. To receive a license, a hydroelectric
project owner must satisfy the regulatory requirements of federal,

414 Public Administration Review • May | June 2012

that his state “has independent regulatory authority and its own
independent procedures for a 401 [water quality] certifi cation.”

Some tribes had authority to mandate license conditions for hydro-
power projects but lacked the appropriate resources to participate
eff ectively in licensing. A representative of a tribal coalition noted
that “we’ve got 25 FERC licenses due in the year 2026 . . . are we
going to have the resources to eff ectively address that?” Tribes had
two forms of discursive legitimacy: one rooted in their legal status
as sovereign nations and another rooted in spiritual and cultural
links to the natural environmental, as these comments from a tribe
member suggest: “Th e river to us is a living body. It speaks to us. We
pray to it. So we don’t make a law to govern it; we make a law to be
cooperative with our relatives in the universe.”

NGOs had little authority except to make public comment. Th e
availability of resources varied by organization, but most had few
resources to dedicate specifi cally to relicensing. One NGO repre-
sentative noted, “Th ese little groups have absolutely no paid staff .
Th is is all done with volunteer time, and people work very hard to
get this done.” Discursive legitimacy was rooted in the NGOs’ role
in the democratic process and their role in representing public and
environmental interests, as seen in the words of a river advocate: “It
is the very survival of humanity that is in the balance here, not the
money that is being made by the owners . . . but the very life and
the quality of life that we experience and will continue to experience
and our grandchildren will continue to experience.”

Arenas for Power
Power was used within the collaborative process to infl uence who
participated, the nature of the process, and how the content of the
discussions was framed, as summarized in table 2.

FERC infl uenced participation in the collaborative process by
granting two coalitions status as presenters: the NRG and the
IHC. FERC’s public notice for the process included the proposals
developed independently by these groups, and each was allowed
to present its proposal during the fi rst 11 public forums. FERC’s
process designated nearly half of the sessions as forums where tribal
representatives had priority in speaking, which made tribal partici-
pation more likely from a cultural perspective. FERC also used its
authority to design the collaborative process, reinforcing its legal
authority to determine the fi nal rules on licensing.

“FERC completed a massive reform of its hydroelectric licensing
process in a short period of time in a rulemaking largely heralded as
successful by applicants and the many other stakeholders who par-
ticipated in the rewriting process” (Swiger and Grant 2004, 3).

Case Study Analysis
Th e framework for assessing power can be applied to the collabora-
tive process around hydroelectric licensing in order to yield insights
into power dynamics among participants. Sources of power are
examined fi rst, followed by a discussion of how power was exercised
through the participants, process design, and content of the collabo-
rative process.

Sources of Power
FERC held multiple formal authorities, including the authority to
issue hydroelectric licenses (16 U.S. 817), the authority to deter-
mine licensing procedures (42 U.S. 7173), and the authority to
determine the collaborative process (5 U.S. 553). FERC had ample
fi nancial, informational, and human resources to invest in the
process. Its discursive legitimacy arose from representing the federal
government’s interests in energy supply.

Owners had little authority except the choice of whether to pursue
a project that required licensing, but they had signifi cant fi nancial,
informational, and human resources. Th eir discursive legitimacy
arose from the importance of their industry to the national energy
supply and the economic rationality of hydropower projects.

Other federal and state agencies had the authority to enforce
legislation such as the Environmental Protection Act, the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, and the Clean Water Act. Hydroelectric projects
are governed by these laws, but, as a FERC attorney noted, “[Agen-
cies] say they don’t have independent authority to require applicants
to provide information that they think is necessary. Th ey have to
come to FERC and ask us, acting through the Federal Power Act, to
make the applicant to do the study.” Agencies had fewer resources
available to process license applications because of their broader
missions. A state agency representative commented, “Th irty days is
not an adequate period of time for an informed group of resource
agency staff to generate somewhere on a scale of sixty or eighty
study plans and have them submitted in a timely manner.” Th e dis-
cursive legitimacy of resource agencies was rooted in law and linked
to the constituency represented. One participant reminded others

Table 2 Power in the FERC Collaborative Process

ARENAS FOR POWER

Formal Authority Resources Discursive Legitimacy

PROCESS
ELEMENTS

Participants FERC grants NRG and IHC representatives
status as presenters

Owners, agencies, attorneys, and consult-
ants participate as part of their job duties

Public, NGOs, and tribes rely more on
personal time and funds

Some tribes send chiefs
Some owners participate through their

attorneys
Federal agencies are in a coalition with FERC

Process
Design

FERC frames the collaborative process as
rulemaking

FERC splits meetings into tribal and public

FERC selects and pays for facilitator and
meeting rooms

Tribes have designated meetings to present
their concerns

IHC and NRG proposals are distributed and
presented

Content FERC provides nine questions to frame the
collaborative process

National Hydropower Association and
California state agencies enter their
licensing proposals into public record

Stakeholders invest varying amounts of
time and effort in analysis and argument

FERC produces full transcripts of public
meetings

Alternative proposals are entered into public
record without public reading

Tribes emphasize natural and spiritual
framing

Owners emphasize legalistic framing

A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Governance Processes 415

als generated by others were accepted for entry into the public record
but were not presented or distributed. Th e collaborative process with
separate forums designated for tribes increased the discursive legiti-
macy of these participants by linking to tribal traditions emphasizing
civil and communal approaches rather than bureaucratic and judicial
approaches to problems. Tribal leaders used this greater voice to frame
the content of the discussion around the cultural and spiritual value
of the natural resources aff ected by licensing. Th eir comments noted
the incongruence of the rule of law with the natural world: “No single
jurisdiction will ever have complete control of the salmon life cycle.”
Owners countered this eff ort by asserting the importance of rational,
technical standards: “[Th e process] needs to encourage the use of neu-
tral, objective decision criteria for assessing ideas, making decisions
and resolving disputes.”

Discussion
Th e case study illustrates how the proposed framework can be used
to assess sources of power and how power is exercised during col-
laborative processes. Th is knowledge can be used to provide a more
thorough understanding and evaluation of collaborative processes
and their outcomes and to gather insights that can improve collabo-
rative process design.

First, the multidimensional defi nition of power off ered by the frame-
work allows a richer understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of
collaborative processes. Th e framework suggests that each participant
in a collaborative process should be assessed on three dimensions of
power to reveal relative strengths and weaknesses. Th is approach ben-
efi ts not only researchers and observers but also participants in such
processes by overcoming their self-serving biases in assessing power.
Participants in collaborative processes may hold more limited defi ni-
tions of power based on the sector and institutional realm to which
they belong. For example, government agencies are likely to frame
power in terms of legal authority because it is the type of power
that they typically hold. Similarly, business organizations may frame
power in terms of resources, and nonprofi t organizations in terms of
values and discursive legitimacy. Assessing participants across all three
dimensions may support the recognition and reinterpretation of par-
ties’ abilities to infl uence the process. Kanter (1977) notes that power
begets power and powerlessness begets powerlessness, refl ecting that

behavior is infl uenced by the attributions of
power that people make about themselves and
others. Conducting an assessment of power
could reveal mistaken beliefs and hidden
sources of power that may reduce overcon-
fi dent, defensive, or domineering behaviors
during collaborative processes.

A process for such assessment could involve
evaluating collaboration participants on the
dimensions of power described in the frame-

work (table 1) using a simple fi ve-point scale. Sponsors or conveners
could conduct such an evaluation initially, but in collaborations
in which relationships have been established, participants could
anonymously evaluate all parties, with results tallied and shared by a
trusted neutral facilitator. In ongoing collaborations in which trust
has been established, evaluations of power could be conducted more
openly among participants guided by a facilitator. Alternatively,
meeting notes or transcripts can be evaluated to gauge elements of

FERC used its authority to frame the content of the collaborative
process before the public meetings began by issuing a list of nine
questions to be addressed, beginning with “Is a new licensing process
needed?” While everyone anticipated that the answer would be yes,
the question signaled FERC’s willingness to openly address funda-
mental assumptions about hydropower licensing. Discussion was not
limited to FERC’s questions, but the list guided the comments of
many participants. A few other parties used the authority of the proc-
ess to try to reframe the content of the meetings. A group of state of-
fi cials from California developed their own proposed licensing process
and presented it at a public meeting to illustrate that state authority
had not been suffi ciently addressed in the IHC or NRG proposals.
Th e deputy attorney general of California noted, “We support eff orts
to streamline the energy licensing process, but such streamlining
should not be at the expense of state authority.” Th e National Hy-
dropower Association also created its own proposal for the licensing
process and submitted it into the public record at a meeting.

Th e availability of human, time, and fi nancial resources to participate
in collaborative processes diff ered across participants. Hydropower
project owners, attorneys, consultants, and representatives of state and
federal agencies were able to participate in the process as part of their
job duties, and their costs related to preparation and travel were reim-
bursed. Representatives of tribes and NGOs were less likely to have or-
ganizational resources available, and many relied on personal time and
funds to help support participation. Regarding process design, FERC’s
access to resources allowed it to select the meeting locations, dates, and
facilitators, further cementing its perceived ownership of the collabo-
rative process. Resources also infl uenced the content of the meetings
through the ability to analyze proposals and construct arguments to
support preferred licensing procedures. Owners invested considerable
resources in responding to FERC’s questions and the proposals off ered
by the IHC and NRG groups. One owner sent six employees to a
meeting, while another owner sent attorneys from a law fi rm retained
to represent it in licensing. State agencies were strongly represented in
states such as California, where hydropower was a signifi cant environ-
mental and energy issue, and less strongly represented in other states.
NGOs were often represented by a single individual, and sometimes
that individual represented more than one organization. Finally, FERC
used its resources to create meeting records by arranging for court re-
porters to produce full transcripts of each meet-
ing, off ering a richer record of meeting content
than meeting minutes could provide.

Th e collaborative process strengthened dis-
cursive legitimacy for some participants while
neutralizing others. One eff ort to increase
discursive legitimacy was through the selec-
tion of participants. Some tribes sent chiefs
or elders with high status, and some owners
sent their attorneys to emphasize the validity
and importance of the messages presented by those organizations.
With respect to participation, the federal agencies had successfully
formed a coalition with FERC through the IHC, allowing them to
present a united front and linking them closely to the party with
greatest authority. Discursive legitimacy was also used with respect
to process. FERC implicitly endorsed the IHC and NRG proposals
by distributing them with its public notice and allowing them to be
formally presented at meetings. In contrast, licensing process propos-

Conducting an assessment of
power could reveal mistaken
beliefs and hidden sources
of power that may reduce

overconfi dent, defensive, or
domineering behaviors during

collaborative processes.

416 Public Administration Review • May | June 2012

meetings, participation, or the availability of resources to participants.
Because power is an emergent phenomenon that is shaped by interac-
tion, the static representation of power in table 1 is limited in its abil-
ity to describe ongoing power dynamics in a collaborative governance
process. However, the power framework proposed here can be used to
conduct multiple assessments over the course of a collaborative proc-
ess to evaluate how power dynamics and perceptions are changing.

Th e power framework helps remedy the lack of tools available to
determine when and how to use collaborative processes (Bingham,
Nabatchi, and O’Leary 2005; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006). As-
sessing power can help stakeholders evaluate the dynamics of a process
and develop a greater understanding of the ways in which parties can
be privileged or marginalized in collaborative governance processes.
Th e success of a collaborative process depends on achieving coopera-
tive participation and sharing of power (Hardy and Phillips 1998).
Greater attention to power can help in the design and implementa-
tion of processes that are more representative, inclusive, and impartial,
and lead to greater empowerment within a democratic system.

References
Altheide, David L. 1988. Mediating Cutbacks in Human Services: A Case Study in

the Negotiated Order. Sociological Quarterly 29(3): 339–55.
Andersen, Emily Kay. 2000. Hydroelectric Power and Salmon: A Comparative Case

Study of Eight Hydroelectric Power Projects and the FERC Relicensing Process.
Master’s thesis, University of Washington.

Benson, J. Kenneth. 1975. Th e Interorganizational Network as a Political Economy.
Administrative Science Quarterly 20(2): 229–49.

Bierstedt, Robert. 1950. An Analysis of Social Power. American Sociological Review
15(6): 730–38.

Bingham, Lisa Blomgren. 2009. Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and
the Incomplete Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice. Missouri
Journal of Dispute Resolution, no. 2: 269–326.

Bingham, Lisa Blomgren, Tina Nabatchi, and Rosemary O’Leary. 2005. Th e New
Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in
the Work of Government. Public Administration Review 65(5): 547–58.

Booher, David E. 2004. Collaborative Governance Practices and Democracy.
National Civic Review 93(4): 32–46.

Brockner, Joel, and Phyllis Siegel. 1996. Understanding the Interaction between
Procedural and Distributive Justice: Th e Role of Trust. In Trust in Organizations,
edited by Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler, 390–413. Th ousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.

Broome, Benjamin J. 2002. Participatory Planning and Design in a Protracted
Confl ict Situation: Applications with Citizen Peace-Building Groups in Cyprus.
Systems Research and Behavioral Science 19(4): 313–21.

Bryson, John M., Barbara C. Crosby, and Melissa Middleton Stone. 2006. Th e
Design and Implementation of Cross-Sector Collaborations: Propositions from
the Literature. Special issue, Public Administration Review 66: 44–55.

Butterfi eld, Kenneth D., Richard Reed, and David J. Lemak. 2004. An Inductive
Model of Collaboration from the Stakeholder’s Perspective. Business and Society
43(2): 162–95.

Carlson, Chris. 2008. A Practical Guide to Collaborative Governance. Portland, OR:
Policy Consensus Initiative.

Cheng, Antony S. 2006. Build It and Th ey Will Come? Mandating Collaboration in
Public Lands Planning and Management. Natural Resources Journal 46: 841–858.

Dewulf, Art, Barbara Gray, Linda Putnam, Roy Lewicki, Noelle Aarts, Rene Bouwen,
and Cees van Woerkum. 2009. Disentangling Approaches to Framing in
Confl ict and Negotiation Research: A Meta-Paradigmatic Perspective. Human
Relations 62(2): 155–93.

power such as frequency of participation by various parties and the
pattern of content and process issues raised.

Second, the framework’s rich view of power and the arenas in which
it may be used are valuable tools for balancing power through the
elements of the collaborative process. Leveling the playing fi eld can
make a collaborative process more representative and inclusive, and
over time, it may promote perceptions of fairness that motivate
broader participation in such processes. In the case study, FERC used
its authority over process design to enhance the discursive legitimacy
of tribes, which helped counter the resource power of owners and
create more balanced participation. While FERC retained exclusive
authority over process design, it sought to be inclusive and expand
participation through its choice of geographically diverse meeting
locations. FERC also allowed its content interests to be represented by
the governmental IHC coalition rather than advocating for its own li-
censing proposal, and it off ered the NRG coalition of owners and en-
vironmentalists equal status to the government coalition in presenting
its licensing proposal at public meetings. Th ese activities suggest some
means by which public agencies that initiate collaborative processes
can balance their own high levels of power to avoid dominating such
proceedings. An additional opportunity for power balancing exists for
conveners of collaborative processes, who can decide whether to retain
the power to design the process or share this authority with other
participants. Even though parties to collaboration usually expect some
power diff erences, the goal of rebalancing power should be shared by
all participants with a vested interest in the success of the collabora-
tion, as those with low power can still block or severely delay imple-
mentation of agreed-upon solutions (Straus 2002). Parties may be
content with a level of power that is commensurate with the amount
of interest that they have in the collaborative agenda (Huxham and
Vangen 2005); however, it may be in the best interests of collabora-
tion participants to create incentives to motivate and empower less
powerful participants because the relatively powerless have reason to
be more controlling and coercive (Kanter 1977).

Finally, the power framework suggests strategies for enhancing pow-
er that are available to stakeholders participating in processes that
they did not initiate or design. It can help identify means by which
less powerful participants can be assured of equal access to the col-
laborative process. Coalitions are one means by which participation
can be expanded, resources can be shared, and discursive legitimacy
enhanced. In the case study, NGOs that allied themselves with
hydroproject owners through the NRG enjoyed greater representa-
tion and discursive legitimacy than those that participated inde-
pendently. Federal agencies without direct authority enjoyed similar
benefi ts through their alliance with FERC in the IHC. Another
means of enhancing power is for parties to explicitly frame the issues
in terms of the values or ideals that are the basis of their discursive
legitimacy, which both reinforces the party’s legitimacy as a partici-
pant and challenges assumptions in the deep structure about how
problems should be addressed. In the case study, Native American
tribes used this approach to challenge the bureaucratic and technical
perspectives that dominated discussion during public meetings.

Th e elements of power in a collaborative governance process are often
intertwined, as when a participant uses discursive power to challenge
the authority of the convener to establish the process design. Such
a move might result in a negotiation that changes the structure of

Introducing the Elephant in the Room: Power and Collaboration 417

———. 2005. Managing to Collaborate: Th e Th eory and Practice of Collaborative
Advantage. New York: Routledge.

Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books.
Leach, William D. 2006. Collaborative Public Management and Democracy:

Evidence from Western Watershed Partnerships. Special issue, Public Administra-
tion Review 66: 100–110.

Marshall, Catherine, and Gretchen B. Rossman. 1989. Designing Qualitative
Research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Miles, Matthew B., and A. Michael Huberman. 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis: An
Expanded Sourcebook. Th ousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

National Hydropower Association. 1999. Hydro Relicensing. Washington, DC:
National Hydropower Association.

Norris-Tirrell, Dorothy, and Joy A. Clay. 2010. Strategic Collaboration in Public and
Nonprofi t Administration: A Practice-Based Approach to Solving Shared Problems.
Boca Raton, FL: Taylor & Francis.

O’Leary, Rosemary, and Lisa Blomgren Bingham. 2007. A Manager’s Guide to
Resolving Confl icts in Collaborative Networks. Washington, DC: IBM Center for
the Business of Government.

O’Toole, Laurence J., Jr., and Kenneth J. Meier. 2004. Desperately Seeking Selznick:
Cooptation and the Dark Side of Public Management in Networks. Public
Administration Review 64(6): 681–93.

Policy Consensus Initiative. 2005. What Is Collaborative Governance? http://www.
policyconsensus.org/publicsolutions/ps_2.html [accessed February 6, 2012].

Sharfman, Mark, Barbara Gray, and Aimin Yan. 1991. Th e Context of Interorgani-
zational Collaboration in the Garment Industry: An Institutional Perspective.
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 27(2): 181–208.

Sousa, David J., and Christopher McGrory Klyza. 2007. New Directions in Envi-
ronmental Policy Making: An Emerging Collaborative Regime or Reinventing
Interest Group Liberalism? Natural Resources Journal 47: 377–444.

Straus, David. 2002. How to Make Collaboration Work: Powerful Ways to Build
Consensus, Solve Problems, and Make Decisions. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Swiger, Michael A., and Steven A. Burns. 1998. Cost-Eff ective Relicensing: Choosing
the Right Process. Hydro Review 17(4): 52–61.

Swiger, Michael A., and Megan M. Grant. 2004. Creating a New FERC Licensing
Process. Hydro Review 22(5): 20–22.

DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. Th e Iron Cage Revisited: Institu-
tional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. Ameri-
can Sociological Review 48(2): 147–60.

Everett, Jeff ery, and Tazim B. Jamal. 2004. Multistakeholder Collaboration as Symbolic
Marketplace and Pedagogic Practice. Journal of Management Inquiry 13(1): 57–78.

Follett, Mary Parker. 1918. Th e New State—Group Organization: Th e Solution of
Popular Government. New York: Longmans, Green.

Freeman, Jody, and Laura I. Langbein. 2000. Regulatory Negotiation and the Legiti-
macy Benefi t. New York University Environmental Law Journal 9: 60–151.

Friedland, Roger, and Robert R. Alford. 1991. Bringing Society Back In: Sym-
bols, Practices and Institutional Contradictions. In Th e New Institutionalism
in Organizational Analysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio,
232–63. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Frost, Peter J. 1989. Th e Role of Organizational Power and Politics in Human
Resource Management. In International Human Resources Management, edited by
Albert Nedd, Gerald R. Ferris, and Kendrith M. Rowlands, 1–21. Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press.

Fung, Archon. 2006. Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance. Special
issue, Public Administration Review 66: 66–75.

Gerlak, Andrea K., and Tanya Heikkala. 2005. Comparing Collaborative Mechanisms
in Large-Scale Ecosystem Governance. Natural Resources Journal 46: 657–707.

Gray, Barbara. 1989. Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems.
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

———. 2004. Strong Opposition: Frame-Based Resistance to Collaboration. Journal
of Community and Applied Social Psychology 14(3): 166–76.

Greenwald, Howard P. 2008. Organizations: Management without Control. Th ousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Hardy, Cynthia. 1994. Power and Politics in Organizations. In Managing Strategic Action:
Mobilizing Change, edited by Cynthia Hardy, 220–37. London: Sage Publications.

Hardy, Cynthia, and Nelson Phillips. 1998. Strategies of Engagement: Lessons from
the Critical Examination of Collaboration and Confl ict in an Interorganizational
Domain. Organization Science 9(2): 217–30.

Huxham, Chris, and Siv Vangen. 2000. Leadership in the Shaping and Implementa-
tion of Collaboration Agendas: How Th ings Happen in a (Not Quite) Joined-
Up World. Academy of Management Journal 43(6): 1159–75.

Being a Public Manager in Times of Crisis 759

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 80, Iss. 5, pp. 759–764. © 2020 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.13245.

Zeger Van der Wal
National University of Singapore

Being a Public Manager in Times of Crisis: The Art of Managing
Stakeholders, Political Masters, and Collaborative Networks

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic is seen as the biggest crisis since World War II. What started out as a public
health issue has quickly morphed into a political, economic, and societal crisis of epic proportions. Administrative
capacity is a major factor in determining whether societies will emerge from this unprecedented situation with
resilience and optimism or despair and disconnectedness, and whether trust in government will increase or decrease.
Autonomous and competent public managers are key producers of such administrative capacity. This essay addresses
those public managers, the unsung administrative heroes leading us through times of crisis from behind the scenes.
Translating the state of the art in public administration literature, with a particular emphasis on publications in
this journal, into accessible practitioner recommendations, it identifies three key competencies paramount to public
managers in times of crisis: managing stakeholders, political masters, and collaborative networks.

The COVID-19 pandemic is seen as the biggest
crisis since World War II. What started out
as a public health issue has quickly morphed

into a political, economic, and societal crisis of
epic proportions. Governments across the globe are
struggling to come to terms with how they can most
effectively respond to ongoing events while being
overwhelmed by competing expert assessments, key
public value trade-offs, and capacity constraints.

Administrative capacity is a major factor in
determining whether societies will emerge from this
unprecedented situation with resilience and optimism
or despair and disconnectedness, and whether trust
in government will increase or decrease. However,
media attention almost exclusively concerns political
leaders operating in the spotlight: the front stage of
government. The back stage of government hardly
receives attention. Moreover, common discourse
often undervalues the importance of well-functioning
bureaucracies or even takes the form of “bureaucrat
bashing” (Garrett et al. 2006; Goodsell 2018).

As a result, we hear little about the public managers
who helm the public agencies and service delivery
chains that are critical to the success or failure of
politically forged crisis strategies, which they have
to frantically translate into law and policy and
implement to the best of their abilities. They do
so behind the scenes, in accordance with a long-
established tradition of separating politics from
administration (Nalbandian 1994; Svara 2001;
Wilson 1887).

It is still early days, and making claims about
which countries have employed the best mitigation
strategy so far is tricky. However, countries that
consistently occupy the top rungs of global
governance rankings, such as Singapore, New
Zealand, Australia, Taiwan, and Denmark
(Rothstein 2011; Van der Wal 2017a, 2019), seem
to have addressed the COVID-19 crisis relatively
swiftly, effectively, and competently, at least in
terms of fatalities and infection rates. Clearly,
quality of government matters, perhaps more than
ever before. Autonomous and competent public
managers are the primary actors contributing to
quality of government (Fukuyama 2013). This
certainly also holds for health care emergency
situations, as studies have shown (Henderson 2013).

This essay addresses those public managers, the
unsung administrative heroes leading us through
times of crisis from behind the scenes. Translating
the state of the art in public administration literature,
with a particular emphasis on publications in this
journal, into accessible practitioner recommendations,
it identifies three key competencies paramount to
public managers in times of crisis. First, this essay
outlines the characteristics of the current operating
environment for public managers. Then, it discusses
why stakeholder engagement and communication,
political astuteness, and collaborative capacity are
essential for sailing the ship of government through
times of crisis. Lastly, it provides a set of action points
for public managers seeking to further perfection and
apply these competencies.

Zeger Van der Wal is associate professor

in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public

Policy, National University of Singapore,

and professor by special appointment at

the Faculty of Governance and Global

Affairs, Leiden University. He is a globally

recognized public management expert and

recipient of many teaching and research

awards. He has (co)authored more than

130 publications and serves on the editorial

boards of leading journals. He also regularly

consults for governments across the globe.

Email: sppzvdw@nus.edu.sg

COVID-19
Viewpoint

15406210, 2020, 5, D
ow

nloaded from
https://onlinelibrary.w

iley.com
/doi/10.1111/puar.13245 by T

est, W
iley O

nline L
ibrary on [09/11/2022]. See the T

erm
s and C

onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com

/term
s-and-conditions) on W

iley O
nline L

ibrary for rules of use; O
A

articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C

om
m

ons L
icense

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1111%2Fpuar.13245&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2020-08-07

760 Public Administration Review • September | October 2020

A VUCA Operating Environment
The operating environment created by the COVID-19 pandemic
bears all the characteristics of a VUCA world (Bennett and
Lemoine 2014; Johansen 2007), characterized by volatility,
uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Indeed, the VUCA concept
first emerged in military circles in the post–Cold War environment
of the early 1990s (Hartley 2018), precisely to stimulate thinking
about planning and preparing for operating environments
increasingly characterized by so-called wild cards and black swans.
These are unlikely, high-impact events that are complex, expensive,
and seldom politically expedient to anticipate and plan for (Ho
2008, 2010; Petersen 2000). The COVID-19 pandemic clearly is
such an event, if there ever was one. It presents governments with a
super wicked problem (Levin et al. 2012).

The VUCA concept stipulates that managers have to deal with a
range of “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns,” not only
in terms of projected outcomes but also in terms of the required
skills, strategies, and parameters. Issues surrounded by volatility
and uncertainty are more “known” but challenging in their own
right. They require a certain degree of flexibility and adaptiveness
as well as foresight and strategic planning capabilities. Situations
characterized by complexity and ambiguity are least “known,”
requiring experimentation and piloting as well as the engagement of
unconventional expertise.

Clearly, a VUCA operating environment creates challenges for
public managers tasked with crafting responses to events for
which no clear solutions exist. At the same time, however, such
environments also provide exciting opportunities for innovation
in public service delivery and governance arrangements, in
collaboration with citizens and vanguards of change from other
sectors. The cliché “never waste a good crisis” is often heard these
days.

To turn new challenges into opportunities, public managers need
to master and display a variety of competencies. The remainder of
this essay discusses three essential competencies drawn from research
evidence, illustrated with practical examples in the context of the
current crisis.

Three Key Competencies for Public Managers in Times
of Crisis
Stakeholder Engagement and Storytelling
Explaining and selling unprecedented and unpopular measures to
a wide variety of increasingly anxious and impatient stakeholders
is a herculean task. Clearly, public managers need to sensibly assess
how stakeholders may respond to plans and programs and how they
can move stakeholders in the desired direction and acquire exchange
legitimacy and influence legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Classification
and prioritization are key here, as they largely determine
engagement and participation strategies (Bryson 2004; Fung 2015;
Nabatchi 2012).

After mapping stakeholder dynamics and interrelationships,
public managers need to come up with strategies to manage their
stakeholder allegiances, in order to enlarge their support base while
minimizing the number of adversaries as well as the adversaries’
powers to derail strategies and decisions. Strategic stakeholder

management ultimately aims to grow allegiances by convincing
indifferent stakeholders to become followers or even advocates.

In the current COVID-19 context, we can observe just how
challenging this proves to be. For instance, in the polarized political
environment of the United States, where individual cities and
states communicate, implement, and phase measures differently,
small groups of ideological adversaries of differentiated lockdown
measures may be largely irresponsive to evidence-based counter
frames. At the same time, widely respected epidemiologists and
virologists who are among the few senior bureaucrats operating at
center stage should now seek to maximize their credibility in acting
as advocates of sensible lockdown measures, largely based on the
latest medical know-how, to enhance the follower category, nudging
indifferent stakeholders to move over to the follower category.

Table 1 provides a basic stakeholder allegiance worksheet that shows
how managers can manage and engage stakeholders at various
levels of allegiance in times of crisis (Van der Wal 2017b, 71).
Interestingly, much of the “traffic” is likely to take place toward the
indifferent category, the average citizen or silent majority, where
public managers may have to compete with other actors seeking to
co-opt these stakeholders into their sphere of influence and support.

An illustrative example is how the administrative leadership of the
Singapore Tourism Board suddenly had to deal with a complete halt
of foreigners traveling into the highly globalized city-state, whose
success narrative has been built on being an entrepôt and “perennial
stop-over city” with people traveling in and out 24/7. The board’s
CEO explained,1

The SARS crisis has taught us the importance of frequent
and transparent communications with both our industry
partners and visitors from the onset of the crisis. Since the
start of the COVID-19 outbreak, we have regularly shared the
latest health and travel advisories, kept up our engagement
with them to explain our policy decisions and reassured
them that Singapore remains committed to our long-term
partnership. Apart from stepping up our communications
efforts overseas, we know it is critical to support the industry
in a timely manner during times of need. Another significant
difference from SARS is the prevalence of digital and social
media, which are key channels for us to communicate with
Singaporeans and the international community. We have to

Table 1 Stakeholder Allegiance Worksheet

Level of Allegiance How to Manage

Advocates • Keep on side through active engagement
• Use their input directly and visibly in policies and

proposals
Followers • Increase their understanding of benefits

• Avoid temptation to exploit or take support for
granted

Indifferent • Identify and address knowledge gaps
• Keep informed and updated across platforms

Blockers • Court and convince of mutual interests and agendas
• Actively explain and frame to overcome fears

Adversaries • Counter frames and arguments
• Develop deep understanding of their values and

interests

15406210, 2020, 5, D
ow

nloaded from
https://onlinelibrary.w

iley.com
/doi/10.1111/puar.13245 by T

est, W
iley O

nline L
ibrary on [09/11/2022]. See the T

erm
s and C

onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com

/term
s-and-conditions) on W

iley O
nline L

ibrary for rules of use; O
A

articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C

om
m

ons L
icense

Being a Public Manager in Times of Crisis 761

manage these channels in real-time, as that is the expectation
from our audiences today.

Indeed, to maximize allegiances in the current operating
environment, public managers have to develop antennae for
stakeholder dynamics and become active storytellers who
communicate real life on all the platforms they have at their
disposal. These new competencies will have to complement, and
in some cases replace, more traditional ones such as bargaining and
negotiating (Rhodes 2016), as governments can no longer assume
they are starting from a position of superior authority, power, and
information. Moreover, communication between public managers
and stakeholders consists of bidirectional exchanges (Mergel 2010,
2012), with public managers having to monitor, respond, and
adapt, rather than simply broadcast their points of view (Garnett
and Kouzmin 2007). In other words, they have to skillfully frame
their messaging.

In political science and the communication sciences, the topic
of framing has received ample scholarly attention (Chong and
Druckman 2007; Jacoby 2000), dating back to McLuhan’s (1967)
seminal work The Medium Is the Message. More recently, public
administration scholars have started to show interest in framing
(de Bruijn 2011). Even though most of their examples concern
politicians, particularly in times of crisis, public managers
increasingly have to “go out there” themselves to persuade other
public, private, and civic actors to support their policies, programs,
and proposals.

An additional crucial communicative tool is the ability to
successfully brand policies and programs (Eshuis and Klijn 2012,
11–12). Brands bind because they create loyalty among actors
and networks (Eshuis and Klijn 2012). Indeed, right after it
became clear that the protracted crisis environment required severe
measures and thus long-term stakeholder buy-in, governments
began to frequently and consistently communicate uniting and,
at the same time, sometimes country-unique slogans and labels,
such as “Intelligent Lockdown” and “Beating Corona Together”
(Netherlands), “Let’s All Do Our Part” (Singapore), and “Stay
at Home, Save Lives, and Protect the NHS” (United Kingdom).
Such deliberate policy branding aims to evoke a sense of belonging,
positive association, and collective identity across stakeholders with
sometimes competing interests.

Managing Political Masters with Political Astuteness
Public managers in times of crisis have to be politically astute
to critically advice their political masters—that is, speak truth
to power without risking getting sidelined. This competency,
defined by Hartley et al. (2013, 24) as “deploying political skills in
situations involving diverse and sometimes competing interests and
stakeholders, in order to achieve sufficient alignment of interests and/
or consent in order to achieve outcomes,” is relevant to managerial
work across sectors, particularly for those in more senior positions.

Being neutral about political outcomes, political astuteness pertains
to “small p” as well as “big P” politics—the informal as well as the
formal, according to Hartley et al. (2015, 197). Although the use
of “political” extends to political interactions across a wide range of
issues, arenas, and stakeholders, reading and accommodating the

styles, agendas, and stakeholder allegiances of administrative and
political bosses is particularly crucial. We see these dynamics playing
out on our television screens every day.

Moreover, an ever-important responsibility of public managers
in times of crisis is to keep their head cool, to maintain the long
view, and to ensure a degree of institutional continuity and policy
consistency. It is far from easy to successfully enact this response to
the current turbulence bestowed upon us by the pandemic, not in
the least given how political leaders respond to and often add to this
turbulence. Indeed, the crisis places increased responsibility upon
public managers to maintain a sense of continuity and neutrality
in managing institutions and policies, both in terms of situational
“emergency management” as well as institutional “crisis leadership”
(’t Hart 2014, 137). In other words, being politically astute does
not mean that one can neglect to safeguard important institutional
qualities and values in times of turbulence.

At the same time, crises provide opportunities for maximizing
bureaucratic power and influence (Frederickson and Matkin 2007;
Partridge 1974) by consistently pushing sound policy proposals
and maintaining order, continuity, and collegiality in turbulent
times. Indeed, public managers have always derived much of their
legitimacy and authority from domain knowledge and experience,
and studies show that expertise is among the values considered
most important by public managers in various countries (Van der
Wal 2008; Yang and Van der Wal 2014). Politicians, often lacking
such expertise, depend on public managers for authoritative advice
and support (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981), and political
executives eagerly outsource the organization of sufficient expertise
to their administrative apparatus.

However, the perceived importance of domain expertise for public
managers has ebbed as a consequence of increasing job rotation and
emphasis on managerial skills within senior executive services across
the globe, and increased political populism and polarization (’t
Hart and Wille 2006; Van der Wal 2017b). This, in turn, may have
weakened their positions of authority vis-à-vis political bosses.

Particularly in times of crisis, clusters and “camps” of public
managers and their constituents will always compete for attention
and authority. In the Netherlands, for instance, the prime minister
characterized the recommendations of the Outbreak Management
Team, populated by highly credentialed leaders from the medical
space, as “sacred” during the first two months of the crisis.
Particularly when it became clear that the crisis would be protracted
and morph into stages of economic recovery and long-term social
adjustment (Boin et al. 2016), academic experts, other parts of
the bureaucracy, and opposition parties argued for an Impact
Management Team to provide a more diverse inflow of advice. So
far, no such team has been formally established, but the government
has broadened the circle of experts it consults.2

In addition, the abundance of publicly available data, made
accessible by information brokers with more or less altruistic
intentions, completes the picture of today’s competitive public
sector information landscape. As a result, competing streams of
information and policy advice find their way up to the highest
echelons (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017).

15406210, 2020, 5, D
ow

nloaded from
https://onlinelibrary.w

iley.com
/doi/10.1111/puar.13245 by T

est, W
iley O

nline L
ibrary on [09/11/2022]. See the T

erm
s and C

onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com

/term
s-and-conditions) on W

iley O
nline L

ibrary for rules of use; O
A

articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C

om
m

ons L
icense

762 Public Administration Review • September | October 2020

Table 2 lists three key challenges for public managers striving to
remain authoritative experts and suggests actions and approaches for
mitigating these challenges. Clearly, both expertise and managerial
skills are important, but the importance of being viewed as
politically astute should not be underestimated if public managers
want to remain relevant, legitimate, and authoritative when
managing up, certainly in a crisis context in which evidence and
expertise are constantly disputed.

Empowering and Leveraging Collaborative Networks
A crisis forces public managers to collaborate more closely
within different, sometimes ad hoc networks consisting of state
and nonstate actors—citizens, nongovernmental organizations,
businesses, charities, and social enterprises. For more than two
decades, scholars have argued that collaborative public management
is not just a necessity but an inevitability (Agranoff 2006; Bryson,
Crosby, and Stone 2015; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012;
McGuire 2006). This is not to say, however, that public managers
and their political masters wholeheartedly embrace this notion. In
fact, the urge to simplify, reduce, monopolize, and bureaucratize
super wicked problems like the COVID-19 pandemic is still
omnipresent.

Effective collaboration requires managers to bring together
widely divergent agendas, norms, working styles, worldviews, and
opportunistic motives of partners. Just think of the initial battles
between and within governments over the purchase of medical
equipment, the support of specific industries, and attempts
to acquire vaccines: while individual governments would have
benefited from more collaboration, they behaved in the exact
opposite way in the context of “every country for itself.” Various
producers of medical equipment utilized the environment of scarcity
to increase prices substantially.

Moreover, various entrepreneurial initiatives emerged, with
individuals and ad hoc business ventures without any experience in
producing medical equipment assertively offering their services to
many European countries, some well intended but others much less
so.3 In many cases, public managers became reluctant to engage with
citizen initiatives as well as unknown producers in other countries
for fear that amateur contributions would degrade service quality,
an observation that is congruent with earlier research (Alford and
O’Flynn 2012, 132–133).

As the crisis moves into a different phase, we are witnessing
increasing collaboration between and within bureaucracies with
regard to the major policy challenges that now present themselves—
such as the nature of collectively funded stimulus packages4 and the
funding of transboundary research into medical and nonmedical
aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic5—and between public and
private actors in developing and providing access to vaccines.6

One important issue that is sometimes overlooked in the vast
literature on collaborative management is worth mentioning in
the current context: public managers struggle, first and foremost,
with getting collaboration going within their own government,
certainly when the “we’re in this together” sentiment present during
the initial crisis phase wanes. As public managers assume that the
interests and agendas of nongovernmental partners differ from
theirs, their expectations for these partners may be lower but also
more easily exceeded.

Despite years of talking about “whole of government” and
“joined-up government” (see Christensen and Lægreid 2007), this is
still not the norm, even more so for collaboration in supranational,
multilevel, and cross-national settings such as the United Nations,
the World Health Organization, or the European Union, displayed
all too painfully in this present time. Therefore, many of the
challenges and competencies discussed here apply just as much to
realizing intragovernmental and intergovernmental collaboration—a
key precondition for successful multisectoral partnerships (see also
Howes et al. 2014).

Moving Forward: Action Points
This essay concludes with four action points for public managers in
times of crisis:

1. Invest in communicative capacity and social media skills to
complement more traditional administrative crafts, through
recruitment as well as development of existing cohorts.

2. Make an effort to engage stakeholders (supportive and
adversarial), as winning them over will produce significant
long-term gains in terms of legitimacy and support.

3. Maintain a nodal position in competing streams of advice
targeting political masters, as providing credible and usable
information in a timely manner allows for a more critical
stance when needed.

4. Strive to balance control and flexibility in collaborating with
other actors and sectors while realizing not all risks can be
mitigated in seeking added value from (ad hoc) partners.

Notes
1 “Supporting Stakeholders through COVID-19 and Planning for Recovery in

Singapore,” City Nation Place, April 8, 2020, https://www.citynationplace.com/
stakeholders-citizens-covid-19-crisis-singapore (accessed July 6, 2020).

2 See https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/rutte-gaat-meer-experts-raadplegen-en-meer-
zelf-de-politieke-regie-nemen~b47ede1f/?referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
google.com%2F (accessed July 6, 2020).

3 See “Hunt for Medical Supplies Creates Marketplace of Desperation, U.S. News
& World Report, April 4, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/us/
articles/2020-04-04/hunt-for-medical-supplies-creates-marketplace-of-
desperation; Liza Lin and Eva Xiao, “China’s Medical-Goods Market Is ‘Wild
West’ amid Surging Coronavirus Demand,” Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2020,

Table 2 Public Managers as Authoritative Experts: Challenges and Strategies

Challenges Strategies

Open data
Data from a wide variety of sources

are publicly available and easily
accessible.

Filter, translate, and broker public
data presented to political and
administrative masters.

Competitive advice
Consultants, international agencies,

interest groups, lobbyists, and
colleagues eagerly offer expertise to
political and administrative bosses.

Collaborate with but set conditions
and norms for external advisers
to masters and penalize
noncompliance.

“Politics of expertise”
Political and administrative bosses and

professional groups contest expertise
and evidence, certainly in times of
crisis

Organize channels and allegiances of
expertise, rather than losing energy
over continuous battles with actors
who may be hard to convince anyway.

15406210, 2020, 5, D
ow

nloaded from
https://onlinelibrary.w

iley.com
/doi/10.1111/puar.13245 by T

est, W
iley O

nline L
ibrary on [09/11/2022]. See the T

erm
s and C

onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com

/term
s-and-conditions) on W

iley O
nline L

ibrary for rules of use; O
A

articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C

om
m

ons L
icense

Being a Public Manager in Times of Crisis 763

https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-medical-goods-market-is-wild-west-amid-
surging-coronavirus-demand-11587654973; Fab Lab Baltimore, http://www.
fablabbaltimore.org/ (amateurs making masks and face shields); Peter Allen
Clark, “‘This Is Truly a Last Resort.’ Makers Are 3D Printing Ventilator Parts
and Sewing Masks amid a Critical Shortage in Medical Supplies,” Time, April 1,
2020, https://time.com/5811091/makers-3d-printing-coronavirus/; and Sarah
Sexton, “It Takes a Village to Make Face Masks for the Region,” Route Bay City,
April 16, 2020, https://www.secondwavemedia.com/baycity/features/4m-mask-
makers.aspx (all accessed July 6, 2020).

4 BBC News, “Coronavirus: France and Germany Propose €500 bn Recovery
Fund,” May 18, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52712370
(accessed July 6, 2020).

5 Jeffrey Mervis, “Massive U.S. Coronavirus Stimulus Includes Research Dollars
and Some Aid to Universities,” Science, March 25, 2020, https://www.
sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/massive-us-coronavirus-stimulus-includes-
research-dollars-and-some-aid-universities; and European Parliament, “EU
Action: Research on Covid-19 Vaccines and Cures,” updated June 6, 2020,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/
society/20200323STO75619/eu-action-research-on-covid-19-vaccines-and-cures
(both accessed July 6, 2020).

6 European Commission, “Coronavirus Global Response: 7.4 Billion Raised for
Universal Access to Vaccines,” May 4, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_797 (accessed July 6, 2020).

References
Aberbach, Joel D., Robert D. Putnam, and Bert Rockman. 1981. Bureaucrats and

Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Agranoff, Robert. 2006. Inside Collaborative Networks: Ten Lessons for Public

Managers. Special issue, Public Administration Review 66: 56–65.
Alford, John, and Janine O’Flynn. 2012. Rethinking Public Service Delivery:

Managing with External Providers. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bennett, Nathan, and G. James Lemoine. 2014. What VUCA Really Means for You.

Harvard Business Review 92(1–2): 27.
Boin, Arjen, Paul’t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. 2016. The Politics of

Crisis Management. Public Leadership under Pressure. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press.

Bryson, John M. 2004. What to Do When Stakeholders Matter: Stakeholder
Identification and Analysis Techniques. Public Management Review 6(1):
21–53.

Bryson, John M., Barbara C. Crosby, and Melissa Middleton Stone. 2015. Designing
and Implementing Cross-Sector Collaborations: Needed and Challenging. Public
Administration Review 75(5): 647–63.

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. A Theory of Framing and Opinion
Formation in Competitive Elite Environments. Journal of Communication 57(1):
99–118.

Christensen, Tom, and Per Lægreid. 2007. The Whole-of-Government Approach to
Public Sector Reform. Public Administration Review 67(6): 1059–66.

de Bruijn, Hans. 2011. Framing: Over de macht van taal in de politiek. Amsterdam:
Atlas.

Emerson, Kirk, Tina Nabatchi, and Stephen Balogh. 2012. An Integrative
Framework for Collaborative Governance. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory 22(1): 1–29.

Eshuis, Jasper, and Erik-Hans Klijn. 2012. Branding in Governance and Public
Management. New York: Routledge.

Frederickson, H. George, and David S.T. Matkin. 2007. Public Leadership as
Gardening. In Transforming Public Leadership for the 21st Century, edited by
Ricardo S. Morse, Terry F. Buss, and C. Morgan Kinghorn, 34–46. Armonk,
NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2013. What Is Governance? Governance 26(3): 347–68.

Fung, Archon. 2015. Putting the Public Back into Governance: The Challenges
of Citizen Participation and Its Future. Public Administration Review 75(4):
513–22.

Garnett, James L., and Alexander Kouzmin. 2007. Communicating throughout
Katrina: Competing and Complementary Conceptual Lenses on Crisis
Communication. Public Administration Review 67(Special issue): 171–88.

Garrett, R. Sam, James A. Thurber, A. Lee Fritschler, and David H. Rosenbloom.
2006. Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy Bashing by Electoral Campaigns.
Public Administration Review 66(2): 228–40.

Goodsell, Charles T. 2018. Bureaucrat Bashing. In Defining Public Administration:
Selections from the International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration,
edited by Jay M. Shafritz, Jr., 128–31. New York: Routledge.

Hartley, Jean. 2018. Ten Propositions about Public Leadership. International Journal
of Public Leadership 14(4): 202–17.

Hartley, Jean, John Alford, Owen Hughes, and Sophie Yates. 2013. Leading with
Political Astuteness: A Study of Public Managers in Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom. Melbourne: Australia and New Zealand School of Government
and Chartered Management Institute. https://www.anzsog.edu.au/resource-
library/research/leading-with-political-astuteness [accessed July 6, 2020].

Hartley Jean, John Alford, Owen Hughes, and Sophie Yates. 2015. Public Value and
Political Astuteness in the Work of Public Managers: The Art of the Possible.
Public Administration 93(1): 195–211.

Henderson, Alexander C. 2013. Examining Policy Implementation in Health
Care: Rule Abidance and Deviation in Emergency Medical Services. Public
Administration Review 73(6): 799–809.

Ho, Peter. 2008. Governance at the Leading Edge: Black Swans, Wild Cards, and
Wicked Problems. Retrieved from https://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/
Ethos/Issue%204%20Apr%202008/Documents/HCS%20Peter%20
Ho-Speech%20at%20the%204th%20Strategic%20Perspectives%20Conference.
pdf.

Ho, Peter. 2010. ‘Thinking About the Future: What the Public Service Can Do’.
Ethos 7. Available at: https://www.cscollege.gov.sg/Knowledge/Ethos/Issue%20
7%20Jan%202010/Pages/Thinking-About-the-Future-What-the-Public-
Service-Can-Do.aspx.

Howes, Michael, Peter Tangney, Kimberley Reis, Deanna Grant-Smith, Michael
Heazle, Karyn Bosomworth, and Paul Burton. 2014. Towards Networked
Governance: Improving Interagency Communication and Collaboration for
Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation in Australia. Journal
of Environmental Planning and Management 58(5): 757–76.

Jacoby, William G. 2000. Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government
Spending. American Journal of Political Science 44(4): 750–67.

Johansen, Bob. 2007. Get There Early: Sensing the Future to Compete in the Present.
San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Levin, Kelly, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein, and Graeme Auld. 2012.
Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining our Future
Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change. Policy Sciences 45(2): 123–52.

McGuire, Michael 2006. Collaborative Public Management: Assessing What We
Know and How We Know It. Special issue, Public Administration Review 66:
33–43.

McLuhan, Marshall. 1967. The Medium Is the Message. New York: Penguin.
Mergel, Ines. 2010. Government 2.0 Revisited: Social Media Strategies in the Public

Sector. Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.
———. 2012. Social Media in the Public Sector: A Guide to Participation,

Collaboration and Transparency in the Networked World. Hoboken, NJ: John
Wiley & Sons.

Nabatchi, Tina. 2012. Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the Practice and Impact of
Deliberative Civic Engagement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nalbandian, John. 1994. Reflections of a “Pracademic” on the Logic of Politics and
Administration. Public Administration Review 54(6): 531–6.

15406210, 2020, 5, D
ow

nloaded from
https://onlinelibrary.w

iley.com
/doi/10.1111/puar.13245 by T

est, W
iley O

nline L
ibrary on [09/11/2022]. See the T

erm
s and C

onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com

/term
s-and-conditions) on W

iley O
nline L

ibrary for rules of use; O
A

articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C

om
m

ons L
icense

764 Public Administration Review • September | October 2020

Partridge, P.H. 1974. An Evaluation of Bureaucratic Power. Australian Journal of
Public Administration 33(2): 99–115.

Petersen, J. L.. 2000. Out of the Blue: How to Anticipate Big Future Surprises. Lanham:
Madison Books.

Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2017. Public Management Reform: A
Comparative Analysis–Into the Age of Austerity. New York: Oxford University
Press.

Rhodes, R.A.W. 2016. Recovering the Craft of Public Administration. Public
Administration Review 76(4): 638–47.

Rothstein, Bo. 2011. The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and
Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Suchman, Mark C. 1995. Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
Approaches. Academy of Management Review 20(3): 571–610.

Svara, James H. 2001. The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics
and Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration. Public
Administration Review 61(2): 176–83.

’t Hart, Paul. 2014. Ambtelijk Vakmanschap 3.0. De zoektocht naar het handwerk van
de overheidsmanager [Administrative Craftmanship 3.0. The search for the craftwork
of the public manager]. The Hague: VOM.

’t Hart, Paul, and Anchrit Wille. 2006. Ministers and top officials in the Dutch core
executive: Living together, growing apart? Public Administration 84(1): 121–46.

Van der Wal, Zeger. 2008. Value Solidity. Differences, Similarities and Conflicts between
the Organizational Values of Government and Business. Amsterdam: VU University.

——— 2017a. Small Countries, Big Performers. In Search of Shared Strategic
Public Sector HRM Strategies in Successful Small Countries. International
Journal of Public Administration 40(5): 443–58.

——— 2017b. The 21st Century Public Manager. London: Macmillan Education.
Wilson, Woodrow. 1887. The Study of Public Administration. Political Science

Quarterly 2(2): 197–222.
Yang, L., and Zeger Van der Wal. 2014. Rule of Morality vs. Rule of Law? An

Exploratory Survey Study of Civil Servant Values in China and the Netherlands.
Public Integrity 16(2): 187–206.

15406210, 2020, 5, D
ow

nloaded from
https://onlinelibrary.w

iley.com
/doi/10.1111/puar.13245 by T

est, W
iley O

nline L
ibrary on [09/11/2022]. See the T

erm
s and C

onditions (https://onlinelibrary.w
iley.com

/term
s-and-conditions) on W

iley O
nline L

ibrary for rules of use; O
A

articles are governed by the applicable C
reative C

om
m

ons L
icense

34

CHAPTER 2

Initiating Collaborative Governance
The System Context, Drivers, and Regime Formation

The secret of getting ahead is getting started.
—Mark Twain

Getting started can be the most difficult challenge for collaborative governance. As with all collective
action problems, it is difficult to stimulate individuals to act beyond their immediate self-interest and work
together on shared problems. It is particularly difficult to stimulate heterogeneous groups of people to
work in concert across organizational and sectoral divides (Thomas 2003; Ostrom 1998; Schlager 1995).
Given this challenging context, how do collaborative governance regimes (CGRs) emerge and form? What
conditions and factors influence their creation and development?

In this chapter we discuss the surrounding system context—that is, the broader set of conditions that
influence the formation and performance of CGRs—as well as the essential drivers that work together to
initiate this collaboration. We then offer a short case illustration of the National Collaborative for Higher
Education Policy, which demonstrates the role of the system context and drivers in CGR formation. We
conclude with a brief chapter summary.

The System Context

Cross-boundary collaboration does not occur in a vacuum. Like nearly everything in the organizational
world, CGRs emerge and evolve within a complex system context (shown in ) that consists offigure 2.1
numerous, layered, and interrelated conditions—political, legal, economic, social, cultural, and
environmental (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996). This broad and dynamic context creates opportunities and
constraints that directly affect CGRs at the outset and shape their contours as they evolve. Specifically, the
context not only influences the initiation of CGRs but also affects the dynamics and performance of CGRs
over time. For example, once collaboration has been started, expected events (e.g., an election, the passage
of legislation, or the enactment of a regulation) and unexpected events (e.g., an extreme weather event or
the resignation of a significant leader) can open up new possibilities or pose unanticipated challenges. This
ongoing temporal nature led us to depict the system context in the integrative framework as a
three-dimensional space surrounding the CGR and its outcomes and adaptation, rather than as a separate
set of starting conditions.

It is important to analyze this dynamic system context to develop a fuller understanding of the
practicality, viability, and sustainability of CGRs. Some conditions pose risks that may discourage an
emergent CGR early in the process, whereas other conditions, if unidentified, may derail the CGR down
the line. For example, without a robust understanding of the system context, potential participants may
take certain conditions as “givens”—as things that cannot be changed—and consequently may determine
that collaboration is undesirable or infeasible. Alternatively, participants may accept the conditions at the
outset and proceed accordingly, allowing those givens to shape their collective purpose, target goals, and
shared theory of change—only to discover that the conditions change, greatly affecting their work. In
either case, a comprehensive understanding of the system context could have better informed the
participants about the opportunities for and constraints on cross-boundary collaboration.

Not only does the system context shape the overall nature of the CGR; the CGR’s collaborative actions
and the consequent outcomes of those actions can also affect the system context (see ). Indeed,chapter 4

C
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t

2
0
1
5
.

G
e
o
r
g
e
t
o
w
n

U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

P
r
e
s
s
.

A
l
l

r
i
g
h
t
s

r
e
s
e
r
v
e
d
.

M
a
y

n
o
t

b
e

r
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
d

i
n

a
n
y

f
o
r
m

w
i
t
h
o
u
t

p
e
r
m
i
s
s
i
o
n

f
r
o
m

t
h
e

p
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
r
,

e
x
c
e
p
t

f
a
i
r

u
s
e
s

p
e
r
m
i
t
t
e
d

u
n
d
e
r

U
.
S
.

o
r

a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e

c
o
p
y
r
i
g
h
t

l
a
w
.

EBSCO Publishing : eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost) – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS
AN: 1149601 ; Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi.; Collaborative Governance Regimes
Account: s3652670.main.eds

35

one of the core rationales for embarking on collaborative governance is to influence the surrounding set of
conditions that create, aggravate, or sustain a problem. Efforts to foster changes in these surrounding
conditions are inherently long term and complex, and no effort will be successful unless the participants
are clear about the conditions targeted for change.

In short, CGR initiators and participants should have a robust understanding of the many conditions in
the surrounding system context, and they should move from ignoring or treating these conditions as
“givens” to treating them as issues that can and should be monitored and addressed over time. Researchers
have identified several external conditions that may influence the nature and prospects of CGRs (e.g.,
Ansell and Gash 2008; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006; Thomson and Perry 2006; Wood and Gray 1991).
Here, we present six of the most salient conditions, but we recognize that this is not an exhaustive
enumeration.

First, are particularly central, providing the baseline problem orpublic resource or service conditions
opportunity around which CGRs form. Public resource conditions include the state of depletion, pollution,
or extraction potential of environmental and natural resources. Human-made resource conditions refer to
the inadequacy, deterioration, or risk to public health or safety of physical infrastructure, such as potable
water supplies, transportation systems, and public housing. Public service conditions encompass the
quality, extent, and distribution of public health and human services, public education, welfare assistance,
the public regulation of financial services, and so forth. The breadth and variety of these resource and
service conditions are considerable, and CGRs generally emerge in response to concerns about them. In
particular, these and other related conditions might be targeted for improvement, expansion, or limitation
through collaborative action (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007).

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

36

Figure 2.1 The System Context

Second, emerging from legislative, administrative, regulatory, and judicialpolicy and legal frameworks
systems enable and constrain not only public decision making and private action but also the work of
CGRs (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006; Scott and Meyer 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). These
institutional frameworks include the substantive laws, rules, regulations, mandates, executive orders,
policy guidance memorandums, and other legal requirements that relate to the management of public
resources and services, as well as to the procedural provisions that affect opportunities for cross-boundary
collaboration. For example, collaborative endeavors can be facilitated and/or hindered by state open
meeting laws, state administrative procedures acts, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, among other local ordinances and state and federal laws and regulations
(see Bingham 2008, 2010; Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary 2005). Moreover, and as discussed below,
effective collaborative action is connected to, if not embedded in, the many existing public policy and legal
frameworks that facilitate and circumscribe it.

Third, —such as income and education levels, communitysocioeconomic and cultural characteristics
health, and ethnic and racial diversity—create the fabric of the public that is interested in, or affected by,
the issue at hand (e.g., Sabatier et al. 2005). The importance of socioeconomic and cultural characteristics
is at least twofold. First, these characteristics may contribute to the quality of, or problems with, public
resource and service conditions. For example, high levels of poverty or low levels of public health in a
community might require the expansion or integration of resources and services. Second, they reflect the
pool of public talent that may be tapped, the financial and information resources that may be accessed, and
the level of complexity that must be addressed in collaborative problem solving. For example, a
community with limited internal expertise or financial resources may need to connect with a larger
network of better-resourced communities to access assistance, or a well-endowed state may not choose to
draw on federal incentives to address a public service issue in a particular manner.

Fourth, can help or hinder CGR efforts. Networks have been defined asnetwork characteristics
“structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not
merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement” (O’Toole 1997, 45).
In the context of CGRs, networks can be thought of in two ways: (1) as the preexisting complex of
overlapping social and organizational networks of which individual collaborators are already a part; and

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

37

(2) as the existing network that connects collaborators, or what scholars refer to as the degree of structural
embeddedness (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997; Ring and Van de Ven
1994).

Particular network characteristics of interest include their density and strength of relationships or ties.
Networks are dense when there are more direct links between a greater number of organizations, and they
are sparse when there are fewer direct links between organizations. The strength of ties within networks is
operationalized by the frequency of interactions between members. Ties are weak when there are few
interactions, and they are strong when there are many interactions (e.g., Granovetter 1973). The denser the
network and stronger the ties, the more likely networked organizations are to have the social capital needed
to effectively communicate and share information and other resources. Moreover, groups and
organizations that already communicate and share information are more likely to collaborate in the future
(Selin and Chavez 1995).

Fifth, exist both formally and informally within and across allpolitical dynamics and power relations
sectors and will affect the formation, continuation, and performance of CGRs. Power is rarely distributed
evenly, and the patterns of influence and control create conditions that not only shape public perceptions
but also shape the individual perceptions and inclinations of potential collaboration participants as they
decide whether to pursue their goals through a CGR. Political dynamics and power relations have many
sources, such as specific organizational control mechanisms, financial resources and responsibilities,
funding processes, and organizational standard operating procedures. These political and power conditions
are critical in providing or limiting access to and support from public decision makers. Moreover, extreme
imbalances in power between stakeholders can make collaboration particularly difficult (e.g., Ansell and
Gash 2008; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006; Huxham and Vangen 2005).

Sixth and finally, between key actors and organizations is another importantthe history of conflict
condition in the system context. Conflict affects the levels of trust between salient organizations (which are
potential CGR participants); and trust, another dimension of social capital, affects the potential for
bringing people together to collaborate (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2008; Radin 1996; Thomson and Perry
2006). Past conflicts can pose challenges for building future working relationships and may inhibit a
CGR’s startup or, at a minimum, may require attention, if not repair, before moving forward.

Together, public resource or service conditions, policy and legal frameworks, socioeconomic and
cultural characteristics, network characteristics, political dynamics and power relations, and the history of
conflict, among other factors in the broad system context, shape the prospects for and challenges of
initiating and sustaining CGRs. They also affect the evolution of CGRs over time. However, despite their
importance, the conditions in the surrounding system context do not in and of themselves lead to the
formation of a CGR. These conditions are merely influences, not causal factors. They provide the context
from which the drivers of CGRs emerge.

The Drivers

Researchers broadly recognize that the “conditions present at the outset of collaboration can either
facilitate or discourage cooperation between stake-holders and between agencies and stakeholders” (Ansell
and Gash 2008, 550). But what propels the initiation of CGRs? We have identified four important drivers
without which, we posit, the call for collaboration would likely go unheeded and collaborative governance
would not unfold: (1) uncertainty, (2) interdependence, (3) consequential incentives, and (4) initiating
leadership (see ). We explore each of these in turn.figure 2.2

Uncertainty

For many public policy issues, the underlying challenges and possible solutions are known, clear, and
agreed upon; however, for other policy concerns, claims about what is true and what is false are unknown,
ambiguous, or disputed (Lindley 2006). These unknowns are captured in the first driver, uncertainty,
which refers to situations of doubt, ambiguity, limited information, and instability related to current and
future conditions, events, resource availability, or decisions by other actors. Drawing on work by Emery

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

38

and Trist (1965), Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006, 45) refer to this condition as “turbulence,” noting that
such complex situations necessitate—or, as we would say, “drive”—organizations “to decrease uncertainty
and increase organizational stability.”

The potential sources of uncertainty are numerous. Uncertainty is a main feature of “wicked” societal
problems (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Rittel and Webber 1973). As we discussed in the introduction,
wicked problems create uncertainty, in large part because there is no agreement on what the problem is.
Indeed, how to formulate the problem the problem. It is more than just the lack of one simple solution;is
rather, there are competing and unknown solutions that further heighten the uncertainty about the problem.
Uncertainty can also arise from partially observable and/or stochastic environments, along with ignorance
and/or apathy. Regardless of its source, uncertainty can drive groups to reduce, diffuse, and share risk
through collaboration. It can also foster creativity and innovation.

Uncertainty, of course, can also drive groups to compete. Collective uncertainty about societal problems
can generate controversy and adversarialism—as, for example, with climate change or immigration policy.
A polarizing political environment merely fans the flames of uncertainty, as with the debate over national
policies such as health care reform and reproductive rights. If the public and those representing its diverse
interests were endowed with perfect information about a problem and its solution, they would be able to
act independently to pursue their interests or respond to risk (Bentrup 2001). One key to turning the
response to uncertainty from competition to cooperation is the acknowledgment of the second driver:
interdependence.

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

39

Figure 2.2 Drivers for the Formation of a Collaborative Governance regime

Interdependence

Collaboration often occurs because individuals and organizations cannot accomplish an important
objective alone (Gray 1989; Thomson and Perry 2006). In a world of shrinking resources and growing
interconnected problems, interdependence—the necessity of mutual reliance for accomplishing goals— is
an almost constant state. Interdependence becomes an essential driver for CGRs after previous attempts to
go it alone prove unsuccessful. Simply put, we often “fail into collaboration” (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone
2006).

When a public authority, jurisdiction, service/resource provider, community group, or nongovernmental
organization does not succeed in addressing a key public issue or need through its internal organization
and with its own resources, then reaching out to other agencies or sectors (or responding to others’
overtures) may become necessary. And necessity, as we are told, is the mother of invention. Necessity can
lead to innovation, risk taking, and sometimes strange bedfellows, when it requires working with previous
competitors and others outside one’s organization, sector, or network.

Game theory suggests that when players have shared information and repeated opportunities to
exchange or interact, they will recognize their interdependence and seek ways out of the cooperators’
dilemma (Lichbach 1996). Thus, the mere existence of interdependence is not enough to drive
collaboration. Rather, people are motivated to collaborate only when interdependencies are recognized by
key actors. Moreover, the motivation to address interdependencies is enhanced by the presence of the third
driver: consequential incentives.

Consequential Incentives

People need enticements to collaborate, and when these enticements are seen as being connected to
important outcomes, the motivation to collaborate increases. Hence the importance of consequential
incentives—which refer to internal issues, resource needs, interests, or opportunities, or to external
situational or institutional crises, threats, or opportunities that must be addressed to mitigate salient risk or

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

40

advance desired conditions for key stakeholders and the broader public. Ansell and Gash (2008)
incorporate incentives to participation as a starting condition in their contingency model for collaborative
governance, and several other scholars have conducted research that informs our understanding of
incentives (e.g., Gray 1989; Gunton and Day 2003; Imperial 2005; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Not all
incentives will be sufficiently prominent to drive the formation of a CGR. To promote collaboration across
boundaries, potential participants must be aware of the incentive and understand that giving it attention and
working together may have positive effects, whereas inattention and failure to work together may have
negative effects. Ultimately, this broad awareness helps create the motivating pressure that induces
individuals to come together to act.

Consequential incentives can take many forms. An incentive may be a matter of mandate. For example,
a new law or regulation requiring collaboration between diverse stakeholder groups might be enacted. An
incentive may be of a temporal nature. For example, a policy window may open or an administrative or
judicial deadline may require a timely response. An incentive may emerge from a dramatic triggering
event or a new set of indisputable facts that makes clear the scope or intensity of the negative
consequences of inaction (Selin and Chavez 1995). For example, an extreme weather event or other natural
disaster may heighten emergency responders’ awareness of the need for more collaboration on the ground.

Not all consequential incentives are negative. For example, a grant or other funding opportunity may
emerge that requires the development of a collaborative initiative. The positive rewards of collaboration
can themselves be consequential. The enticement of monetary compensation or reputational gains from
participation in a CGR may be an important inducement, as might be the potential revenues or indirect
benefits of a problem solved through collaboration. Garnering more negotiating power at the table may be
enough incentive to join a collaborative endeavor. Finally, the consequences of participating in a CGRnot
initiative can also matter. For example, exclusion from sharing joint gains, the lost opportunity to influence
a public decision, or the potential negative perceptions of others may incentivize collaboration.

More important than the particular form of the incentive is its consequential nature. The incentive must
have the properties that make people want to capture ensuing benefits or avoid ensuing losses. However,
even with important and significant consequential incentives, a fourth driver, initiating leadership, must
also be present before a CGR can be launched.

Initiating Leadership

The importance of leadership to cross-boundary collaboration is widely appreciated by both practitioners
and academics (e.g., Ansell and Gash 2008; Bingham and O’Leary 2008; Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).
Collaboration both demands and cultivates opportunities for multiple kinds of leadership over the course of
an endeavor (Carlson 2007). Thus, leadership is an essential driver and can be a significant outgrowth of
collaboration (see ).chapter 3

Here we focus on one specific type of leadership—initiating leadership— which is the final and perhaps
most essential driver for the formation of CGRs. Initiating leadership refers to the presence and actions of
a person or core group that stimulates interest in and instigates preliminary discussions about creating a
collaborative endeavor. Initiating leaders appreciate the challenges of the system context and recognize the
presence and pressure of the other three drivers: the uncertainty of future conditions, the interdependencies
between actors, and the consequences of (in)action. Perhaps most important, initiating leaders must then
generate and supply the “motivational force” for participants to come together. In essence, initiating
leaders act much like a conductor who assembles and directs musicians who may have never played
together before.

Initiating leaders may emerge from a variety of organizations or groups (Koontz et al. 2004). For
example, they may come from one or more government agencies, elected or political offices, or
nongovernmental organizations or civic groups. They may also come from the private sector or be an
influential member of the public. Regardless of their organizational home, initiating leaders, by virtue of
their personal stature and reputation, attract key stakeholders either directly or indirectly through others.
Thus, in pursuing a collaborative effort, initiating leaders tend to have dense professional and social
networks, tend to be known by key individuals, and tend to be seen as sufficiently credible and

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

41

trustworthy. They are able to exercise their formal or informal authority and strategic vision to create the
climate and opportunity for cooperation and to frame the central issue(s) in a sufficiently broad and
inclusive manner (Gray 1989). Effective initiating leaders are viewed as committed to collaborative
problem solving, as willing to not advocate for one particular solution, and as reliably impartial with
respect to other participants’ preferences (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006; Selin and Chavez 1995). In
addition, access to sufficient upfront resources (e.g., staff or meeting location) and the ability to absorb the
initial transaction costs of convening or sponsoring a CGR can strengthen the work of initiating leaders
(Schneider et al. 2003).

These four drivers—uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, and initiating
leadership—work to various degrees and in various combinations to propel the creation of CGRs. In earlier
work, we proposed that the presence of one or more of these drivers was necessary for a CGR to begin,
and that the more drivers that were present and recognized by participants, the more likely it was that a
CGR would be initiated (Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012). We also now see these drivers as being
strongly interconnected. For example, the idea of collaborating with others typically emerges in response
to incomplete information (uncertainty) concerning a problem or issue that cannot be addressed by actors
working alone (interdependence). But uncertainty and interdependence may not be enough to drive
collaboration without some pressure to act to avoid accruing losses or forgoing benefits (consequential
incentives). Even in light of these consequential incentives, CGRs may not take off unless someone can
bring together the relevant parties (initiating leadership). The inverse also holds: Initiating leaders will not
be able to convene others unless they have some level of appreciation for (and can convince the potential
collaborators about) the realities of uncertainty, interdependence, and consequential incentives and how
these issues affect participants’ interests. In short, we have extended our proposition about drivers beyond
the notion that only one might suffice toward a more complex understanding about how they work in
different combinations in relation to the formative type of CGR, an idea we discuss further in .chapter 8

Finally, it is important to recognize the changing nature of CGR drivers. In some cases, all four drivers
will be present and visible simultaneously. In other cases, the drivers may not be present at the same
moment or to the same extent. They may emerge, recede, or evolve over time and in response to each
other, as well as to changing conditions in the system context. For example, initiating leaders may
recognize the need for consequential incentives and take action to develop them. Or interdependencies may
grow and gain attention as uncertainty increases about conditions in the system context. Or uncertainty
may motivate a person to take a leadership role in trying to convene others. Viewed this way, all four
drivers are likely to be present to some degree at the outset and may well evolve and reinforce one another
to create the impetus necessary to bring key collaborators together.

Initiating Collaborative Governance Regimes

Once the essential drivers emerge out of the system context, how do CGRs actually get started? There are
many avenues by which CGRs form, depending in large part on the assessments and actions of the
initiating leaders and their organizational setting and the relationships that are relevant to the issue at hand.

The organizational setting of the initiating leadership plays a significant role in the formation of CGRs
and forms the basis for our CGR typology presented in . In some cases, CGRs will arisechapter 8
organically at the grassroots level, where the initiating leaders form the nucleus of participants directly
affected by the situation and organize to address a shared problem. In our typology, we call these
self-initiated CGRs. Over time, this nucleus may grow to become more inclusive of diverse interests or
integrated with other sources of official or informal authority and influence. Examples of self-initiated
CGRs include Western rangeland cooperatives, like the Malpai Borderlands Group (www

) and the Altar Valley Conservation Alliance (.malpaiborderlandsgroup.org www.altarvalleyconservation
), as well as many local watershed associations (e.g., see Margerum 2011; Weber 2003)..org

In other cases, CGRs are encouraged from above, at the “grasstops” level, where initiating leaders draw
on inducements (or, in some cases, mandates) to incentivize collaboration at another level (Donahue and
Zeckhauser 2011). We call these externally directed CGRs. For example, since 2001, the Collaborative
Forest Restoration program of the US Forest Service has provided grants to groups in New Mexico to

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

http://www.malpaiborderlandsgroup.org

http://www.malpaiborderlandsgroup.org

HOME

HOME

42

foster the collaborative, science-based restoration of critical forests. The eligibility requirement for these
grants stipulates that applicants must “include a diverse and balanced group of stake-holders as well as
appropriate Federal, Tribal, State, County, and Municipal government representatives” (CFRP 2014).

In still other cases, initiating leaders may work through boundary-spanning organizations to convene
and incentivize voluntary collaboration between participants by brokering initial gatherings and managing
early rounds of collaboration dynamics. We call these independently convened CGRs. These
boundary-spanning organizations are often activated by the standing and commitment of the initiating
leaders, as well as by funding opportunities. They may assist the leaders in assessing the system context
and in recommending appropriate first steps to engaging participants in prospective collaborative efforts.
For example, the William D. Ruckelshaus Center at the University of Washington often serves in this
boundary-spanning role by convening multiple parties in voluntary collaborative approaches for policy
development and dispute resolution ( ). In we further develophttp://ruckelshauscenter.wsu.edu chapter 8
these three formative types of CGRs (self-initiated, independently convened, and externally directed) and
explore how the types vary in their path-dependent development.

Regardless of the organizational setting for collaboration, CGR formation starts with the assembling of
participants by the initiating leaders. In some cases, participants are required to participate in the CGR.
Mandated participation is especially common in grasstop, externally directed CGRs because the initiating
leaders have the formal power to command and instruct parties to work together. In other cases, however,
participants come to the table voluntarily—by choice—as is typically the case in self-initiated CGRs.
Independently convened CGRs may have both voluntary and mandated participation. Gaining voluntary
participation is challenging and often dependent on the informal power and relationship capital of the
initiating leaders.

In any case, the task of assembling participants can be made easier if the initiating leaders do the
homework necessary to create an attractive forum for collaboration. Specifically, the initiating leaders need
to think about who the “right” participants are, and why they will want to come together. To do so, leaders
should determine who will view collaboration as a means to influence decision making and who is likely to
share a vision of what could be accomplished collectively. Moreover, the leaders should assess the costs
and benefits for participants in terms of transaction costs, power sharing, resources, time, and effort. In
addition, the leaders should address issues of participant representation not only to assure balanced voices,
public buy-in, and legitimacy but also to generate a useful diversity of perspectives and ideas, which can
lead to a deeper and more thoughtful and comprehensive consideration of issues and potential solutions. In
many ways, these appraisals return the initiating leaders to the assessment of drivers for collaboration,
particularly in terms of incentivizing collaboration.

Such incentives can be enhanced through the invitation process. Getting the involvement of those with
credibility and legitimacy, those who bring the needed talents and resources, and those who are team
players can help encourage others to come to the table. Direct and personal invitations that speak to shared
concerns or values and the importance of collaboration can be critical to such efforts. Building the norms
of trust and reciprocity up front as participants come to the table can help with collaboration dynamics, the
processes through which participants engage, build motivation, and develop the capacity for joint action
(see ). In turn, this is likely to improve both process and productivity performance (see ).chapter 3 chapter 9
In the next section we show the importance of the surrounding system context and the essential drivers
with a short case illustration concerning the formation of a CGR to address higher education policy.

Case Illustration: The National Collaborative for Higher Education Policy

The National Collaborative for Higher Education Policy was launched in 2003 by the Education
Commission of the States, the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, and the
National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education (NCPPHE). The goal of the National
Collaborative was to help states improve their higher education performance by assisting with the
examination of state higher education policies and the development of broad agreement about statewide

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Home

43

priorities for improvement. This case provides an excellent illustration of the multifaceted and complex
nature of the conditions in the surrounding system context, as well as the drivers needed for the initiation
of a CGR.

The NCPPHE, an independent policy research organization, was established in 1998 to promote public
policies that enhance Americans’ opportunities to pursue and achieve high-quality education and training
beyond high school ( ). Recognizing the lack of a commonwww.highereducation.org/about/about.shtml
national framework for evaluating and comparing the fifty US states’ higher education performance, the
NCPPHE decided to launch a long-term evaluation project, Measuring Up, to assess and evaluate systems
of higher education in each of the states. Specifically, the evaluation project sought to grade each state on
how well it prepared students to participate in an accessible and affordable system of higher education that
meets their educational needs and prepares them to contribute to the larger society. Data were compiled
and analyzed for five categories of performance: preparation, participation, affordability, completion, and
benefits. These five categories were selected because they have a crucial impact on opportunity and are
highly susceptible to being influenced by state policy (Callan, Doyle, and Finney 2001).

The project’s first report, ,Measuring Up 2000: The State-by-State Report Card for Higher Education
asserted that “higher education’s benefits are unevenly and often unfairly distributed; they simply do not
reflect the distribution of talent across our country. Despite the major accomplishments of higher education
in America, geography, wealth, income, and ethnicity still play far too great a role in determining the
opportunities that Americans have to prepare for, enroll in, afford, and complete college” (Callan, Doyle,
and Finney 2001, 12).

The second report, , updated each state’s performance and compared the 2000 andMeasuring Up 2002
2002 results. The report concluded that opportunities for higher education were at a standstill for the nation
as a whole. Together, these reports provided the background data that led to the formation of the National
Collaborative for Higher Education Policy.

The System Context for Higher Education

As noted earlier in the chapter, CGRs emerge and evolve within a complex system context that consists of
numerous, layered, and interrelated conditions. Here, we briefly analyze the system context affecting
higher education in the fifty US states.

In terms of public resource or service conditions, the 2000 and 2002 Measuring Up reports
demonstrated a wide variety of problems with higher education in the United States. Although those
reports give specific data for specific states, it is useful to highlight summary results. The 2000 report
concluded: “The state where one lives makes a big difference in one’s opportunity for education and,
ultimately, in one’s life chances. And it isn’t simply a matter of how prosperous the state is: only about 25
percent of the variations in state performance on the indicators used for grading are attributable to state
wealth. This means that 75 percent of the difference in performance is related to other factors, such as state
policy and leadership. Improvement is clearly possible for every state” (Callan, Doyle, and Finney 2001,
16).

The 2002 Measuring Up report compared states’ results on five performance areas. The report found
that states made the most progress in preparing students for college-level education; however, only four
states improved on all measures of preparation, and students in many states still did not have the
opportunity to take challenging high school courses that could prepare them for college. The report also
found that only seven states improved their performance on all measures of participation, and that only
eleven states improved their performance on all measures of affordability. Moreover, though five states
improved their performance on all measures of the timely completion of certificates and degrees, the
completion of degrees at four-year colleges and universities remained low, even among the top-performing
states. In sum, these findings suggested that despite modest improvements in some states, the benefits of
higher education were not accessible to all Americans.

These findings were especially troubling in light of research showing that the United States is falling
behind other countries in terms of developing a skilled and knowledgeable workforce. For example, a 2003
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development comparison of thirty nations found that the

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

http://www.highereducation.org/about/about.shtml

44

United States (1) ranked behind the top five countries in the percentage of twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds
with a high school credential; (2) slipped to fifth in the percentage of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds
enrolled in college; (3) ranked in the bottom half of countries on the proportion of students who complete
college certificate or degree programs; (4) ranked among the top nations in the educational attainment of
older adults (age thirty-five to sixty-four); but (5) dropped to a tie for seventh in the educational attainment
of younger adults (age twenty-five to thirty-four) (Davies 2006). Additional data analysis by the National
Center for Higher Education Management Systems revealed:

The educational pipeline that runs from the start of high school through the completion of college leaks
considerably in every state and large numbers of students drop out at key transition points along the way. On
average across the nation, for every 100 students who are in the ninth grade, less than half will enroll in college
within four years and only about one-fifth will earn a two-year degree (within three years of enrolling in
college) or a four-year degree (within six years of enrolling in college). In some states, the losses are more
significant in high school; in other states, college going rates are low; and in still others, college students do not
persist to earn certificates or degrees (Davies 2006, 3–4).

These and other data led some to suggest that “educational achievement in the United States has stagnated
over the last two decades” and that if the issue is not addressed soon, “the educational advancement of
other nations compared with the United States may change both the way we live and the freedoms we
enjoy” (Davies 2006, 1).

Although these data reveal declines in and real challenges for higher education as a public resource and
service, the policy and legal frameworks are also problematic: “States are the primary public policy units
for all education within our federal system, from public school systems to colleges and universities”
(Callan, Doyle, and Finney 2001, 12). States control public schools, shape the organizational structures of
public institutions of higher education, and influence the relationships between public schools and
institutions of higher education. Moreover, states provide most of the direct support to and oversight of
public higher education institutions and also support both public and private institutions through student
financial aid, tax exemptions, and sometimes direct appropriations. Thus, though federal initiatives are not
without meaning, “only the states have the means and broad responsibility for assuring opportunity for
education and training beyond high school” (Callan, Doyle, and Finney 2001, 12).

The different policies of the fifty states have been influential in shaping the preparation of the collective
American workforce; however, this patchwork approach to higher education has created challenges for
developing systems and policy approaches that advance the United States as a whole. These challenges
have been exacerbated by the fact that historically states have relied on a regulatory approach to higher
education policymaking and budgeting, and now must move forward with new policies that are
“responsive to increased demands for more and better higher education at a time of limited institutional
adaptability and of severely constrained resources” (Callan, Doyle, and Finney 2001, 18).

Creating such policies is difficult given various political dynamics and power relations within state
governments and higher education institutions. Certainly, elected politicians, from governors to state
legislators to local officials, need to work together to address the problems of higher education. However,
these elected officials must also work with the presidents, chancellors, provosts, and governing board
members of public and private higher education institutions. Although these relationships vary from state
to state, it is highly likely that all the states have at least some degree of conflict in the higher education
arena. This conflict might be generated from historic relations, and could, at the very least, emerge from
the realities of institutional and resource constraints. Conflicts may be either mitigated or exacerbated to
the extent that education networks are in place in a particular state, by the socioeconomic and cultural
characteristics of the state, and/or by the degree to which those characteristics are changing.

Drivers for Higher Education Collaboration

In this case, the surrounding system context was rife with conditions that raised the profile of higher
education challenges. Despite these problems, the Measuring Up reports themselves were insufficient for
propelling the creation of a CGR to address the issue. It was not until all four drivers emerged that a CGR
was formed.

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

45

Uncertainty was clearly present and was particularly articulated in concerns about the competitiveness
of the United States in the global economy. For example, Gordon Davies (2006, 1), the director of the
National Collaborative for Higher Education Policy, wrote:

In meeting the challenges of globalization we in the United States need to mobilize our resources and adapt our
public policies so that we do not fall behind other developed and developing nations in educating our
population. As the global economy has developed and other nations have assumed primacy in traditional
manufacturing sectors, most states in the US have had to reshape their economies. Now that several Asian
nations have developed strong capacity in high-technology industries, the effort to compete effectively in this
sector has become urgent for many states as well. Yielding the advantage of a skilled and knowledgeable
workforce to China and India, two emerging economic giants, or to other nations would be a strategic error
with economic and social consequences.

Interdependence was also present and had several dimensions. First, the United States cannot compete in
the global economy by changing the higher education systems of only one or handful of states. Rather,
competitiveness must be assessed across the nation as a whole, which means that all the states needed to
work on this issue. Although individual states certainly had variance in policies, a comprehensive
framework that guided individual state action, particularly in relation to common needs across states, was
required (Davies 2006).

Second, states generally lacked the expertise to move forward on policy change and needed to work
with others. As Callan, Doyle, and Finney (2001, 19) note, “State leaders have little experience in
organizing policymaking along the lines suggested here, much less in designing appropriate public policy
and funding approaches for a more student-centered and market-driven environment. And there is little
experience with the articulation of broad, operational public priorities for overall state performance; with
designing and linking cohesive policies and accountability to priorities; or with sustaining these efforts
politically.” This meant that states had to develop ideas and learn best practices from each other.

Finally, there were interdependencies within the states themselves. No one person or organization could
tackle the challenges of higher education alone. Within each state, government, education, and civic
leaders had to work together to improve the higher education system.

Consequential incentives were also present and were strongly related to the challenges posed by
inaction. For example, Davies (2006, 7) asserted, “We need to begin the hard work of maintaining the most
responsible citizenry and the most skilled and knowledgeable workforce in the world. How we work
together over the next few years will determine how our grandchildren live in the mid-21st century.” For
many, it was clear that unless political and educational leaders brought both their will and skill to
developing a public agenda for higher education, appropriate and meaningful objectives would never be
defined, let alone achieved.

Finally, there was initiating leadership for the National Collaborative for Higher Education Policy.
Actors from the NCPPHE began the convening effort by reaching out to the Education Commission of the
States and the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems. Together, these three nonprofit
organizations gained support for their work from the Pew Charitable Trusts.

With this core leadership team in place, the National Collaborative reached out to states that were
interested in developing new public agendas for higher education that addressed the needs of state
residents and their communities. Five states—Missouri, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington, and West
Virginia—joined in the effort to develop sustainable public agendas for higher education. In addition, the
National Collaborative worked informally with seven other states—Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nevada,
North Dakota, South Carolina, and Tennessee. With these state partners, the National Collaborative shifted
from a single CGR to a series of nested CGRs. In this nested arrangement, one could also work to identify
and examine the system contexts and drivers for the state-level regimes.

In sum, this case demonstrates the importance of understanding the system context and drivers for
initiating a CGR. If the groundwork had not been done on understanding the challenges in the context of
US higher education, then the initiating leaders would not have been able to make a strong case about
uncertainty, interdependence, and consequential incentives. Moreover, without these drivers, the National
Collaborative for Higher Education would never have been formed.

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

46

Summary

In this chapter, we focused on the formation of CGRs. Specifically, we noted that the formation of a CGR
(and, later, its performance) is influenced by the broader set of conditions in the surrounding system
context. Some of the most salient elements of this context include public resource or service conditions,
policy and legal frameworks, socioeconomic and cultural characteristics, network characteristics, political
dynamics and power relations, and the history of conflict. From these and other conditions in the system
context emerge four drivers of CGRs: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, and
initiating leadership. We suggested that various degrees and combinations of these four drivers increase the
likelihood of forming a CGR.

Next, we discussed the steps needed to actually create a CGR—such as inviting, assembling, and
incentivizing potential participants—and noted that the organizational setting of initiating leaders plays an
important role in CGR formation. We also introduced the three main formative types of
CGRs—self-initiated, independently convened, and externally directed—which we discuss in detail in

. Finally, we illustrated the system context and drivers of CGRs with a case about the Nationalchapter 8
Collaborative for Higher Education. In the next chapter we examine collaboration dynamics.

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

47

CHAPTER 3

Collaboration Dynamics
Principled Engagement, Shared Motivation, and the Capacity for Joint Action

Coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working together is success.
—henry Ford

In , we described how collaborative governance regimes (CGRs) emerge and function within achapter 2
system context and are energized by a combination of essential drivers. CGRs may arise slowly or
precipitously, intentionally or organically, and with or without third-party or bridging institutions. But then
what? How does a CGR get off the ground and start moving? How do participants progress from start-up
to action?

In this chapter, we describe the central components and elements of CGRs—the collaboration dynamics
of principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint action. We then provide a short case
illustration written by Tanya Heikkila and Andrea Gerlak that reveals the collaboration dynamics within
one CGR, the Everglades Restoration Task Force. We conclude with a chapter summary.

Conceptualizing Collaboration Dynamics

The process of effective collaboration has been studied from various disciplinary lenses, through which
researchers have observed numerous positive outcomes, such as improved clarity on key issues and
concerns; better integration of relevant knowledge into deliberations; better-quality decisions; more
effective management of differences and conflicts; enhanced trust and mutual respect between the involved
parties; increased social, operational, and decision-making capacity; and greater perceived legitimacy both
within and outside the collaboration (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006;
Emerson et al. 2009; Fung 2006; Leach and Sabatier 2005; Milward and Provan 2000). In general, there
are two approaches to conceptualizing collaborative processes. One approach portrays collaboration as a
linear sequence of cognitive steps or stages that occur over time, including problem definition, direction
setting, and implementation (e.g., Daniels and Walker 2001; Gray 1989; Selin and Chavez 1995). Another
approach views collaboration as consisting of progressively cyclical or iterative interactions between
participants (Ansell and Gash 2008; Thomson and Perry 2006). We take the latter approach in constructing
our integrative framework for collaborative governance.

Specifically, we unpack the processes at play in a CGR through an examination of collaboration
dynamics across three components—principled engagement, shared motivation, and capacity for joint
action (see ). Each of these components has several underpinning elements; and each component,figure 3.1
through its progressive and iterative cycling, also works to generate and support the other two. When
successful, these dynamics reinforce what has been called a “virtuous cycle” of collaboration (e.g., Ansell
and Gash 2008; Huxham 2003; Imperial 2005). By distinguishing between principled engagement, shared
motivation, and capacity for joint action but still connecting them, we are able to better specify the
behavioral interactions, interpersonal relations, and functional components of collaboration dynamics.

It is important to remember that though we describe collaboration dynamics in this chapter primarily as
interactions between participants “at the table,” there are also additional dynamics between each of the
participants and those they represent. All participants’ level of engagement in a CGR will be constrained
by the demands and limitations of their parent organizations or constituencies. Thus, the components of
collaboration dynamics apply directly to the participants but also must extend indirectly to align with and

EBSCOhost – printed on 11/18/2022 12:33 PM via UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS. All use subject to https://www.ebsco.com/terms-of-use

Memphis/ Shelby County
Homeless Organizational Chart

Community

Alliance for

the Homeless

Community: Alliance
for the

Homeless, Inc.
-www.cofth.org

–

A l

1 ‘

Board of

Directors,

CAFTH

Updated: 10/20/17

Memphis City

Mayor Jim

Strickland

Shelby

County Mayor

Lee Harris

Mayors’
Committee to End

Homelessness

�_,
., ..

Governing
– – Council

–

� ….
�,

…. …. j l …. ….
‘ ….

1 ‘ ….
‘ …. …. Memphis and ‘ …. ….

‘ …. Shelby County
‘ …..

Homeless
‘
‘ Consortium
‘ j l

‘
‘
‘ 1 ‘

‘
‘ Monthly Service ‘

‘◄
Provider Meetings and

Committees, including

Continuum of Care,

Emergency Housing

Partnership, Veterans,

Youth, etc.

Memphis/Shelby County, TN Homeless Services System Map

Version: 12/9/2020

Increasing service needs

Permanent
Housing

Examples:

Market-rate
housing

Permanent stay
with family or

friends

Mainstream
affordable

housing (e.g.
LIHTC or

Section 811)

Mainstream
subsidy (e.g.

MHA voucher)

Population:homeless
or unstably housed

individuals and
families

Outreach and System Access Points
Gaps: discharge planning from publicly funded institutions and systems
of care; data sharing agreements; comprehensive street outreach and
service coordination; low-barrier and 24/7 entry points for individuals

Related Strategic Plan Objectives: 1.1, 2.1

Diversion/Mediation
Gaps: funding and resources for diversion activities; formal diversion plan;
additional support for vulnerable populations (domestic violence survivors,

families, youth under age 24, and veterans)
Related Strategic Plan Objectives: 1.2

Shelter and Services
Gaps: increased free, low-barrier, equal access

emergency shelter; better data and information on
unsheltered populations; improved connections between

emergency shelters and Coordinated Entry System
Related Strategic Plan Objectives: 2.2, 2.3

Assessment and Coordinated Entry
Gaps: improved processes for connections to services while individuals

and families await housing, including housing navigation and mental
health/substance abuse services for those who want them

Related Strategic Plan Objectives: 2.3

Rapid Re-housing (RRH)
short-term subsidy & services

Permanent Supportive
Housing (PSH)

long-term subsidy & services

Self-
resolution

Successful
diversion

Transitional
Housing or
In-Patient
Treatment

Gaps: expanded
PSH and RRH
capacity;
expanded
partnerships with
mainstream
affordable
housing
providers and
flexible landlords;
increased and
maximized
permanent
housing
resources;
formalized
training on PSH
and RRH
principles and
best practices;
formal referral
processes
between housing
providers and
mainstream
benefit
resources;
increased
opportunities for
meaningful
engagement with
persons with
lived experiences
Related
Strategic Plan
Objectives: 2.4,
3.1, 3.2Overall System Gaps: broadened understanding around states of housing insecurity that may factor into

future homelessness; clear goals to sustain progress towards ending homelessness; improved
emergency response planning for persons experiencing homelessness

Related Strategic Plan Objectives: 4.1, 4.2

Self-resolution

Red lines indicate gaps and opportunities
for system improvement

Grant Ebbesmeyer
@dustin@cafth.org

• Homeless System Map

Page 1

901 Home, Together:
Strategic Plan to End Homelessness

in Memphis/Shelby County

Approved March 2021

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 1

Memphis/Shelby County

Homeless Consortium

Governing Council – 2020 – 2021

OFFICERS

Chair: Kimberly Mitchell, City of Memphis

Vice-Chair: Phillis Lewis, Love Doesn’t Hurt

Immediate Past Chair: Cornelius Sanders, Promise Development Corporation

MEMBERS

At-Large Members (Elected by the Consortium)

Mary Hamlett, VP of Family Programs, MIFA

Megan Williams, Manager of Complex Care, Regional One Health

Designated Liaisons (Appointed)

City of Memphis Government Liaison: Kimberly Mitchell, Administrator, HCD

Shelby County Government Liaison: Dorcas Young Griffin, Director, Div. of Community Services

Memphis Housing Authority Liaison: Vernua Hanrahan, Special Projects Coordinator

Memphis VAMC Liaison: Jacquelyn Taylor-Mays, Section Chief, Homeless Programs

Shelby County Schools Liaison: Dr. Karen Ball, District Official

Department of Children’s Services Liaison: Merlene Hyman, Regional Administrator

Committee Chairs (Appointed by Chair)

CoC Planning Chair: Porsha Goodman, Executive Director, Door of Hope

Youth Committee Chair: Kiya Black, Metamorphosis Project Case Manager, OUTMemphis

Representatives (Elected by Consortium)

Domestic Violence Representative: Sandy Bromley, Executive Director, Shelby County CVRCC

For-Profit Representative: Matt Grimes

Legal Representative: Shannon Mason, Memphis Area Legal Services

LGBTQ Representative: Phillis Lewis, CEO/Founder, Love Doesn’t Hurt

Philanthropy Representative: LaQuita Rhine

Designated by Bylaws

Lead Agency Executive Director: D. Cheré Bradshaw

Lead Agency Liaison: Grant Ebbesmeyer, CoC Planning Director

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 2

Memphis/Shelby County Homeless Consortium

Association Members – 2020 – 2021
As of March 10, 2021

A Home for Heroes Residential Facility
Agape Child & Famly Services, Inc.
Alpha Omega Veterans Services, Inc.
American Job Centers –
Greater Memphis Region
Baptist Operation Outreach
Calvary Episcopal Church
Catholic Charities of West TN
Christ Community Health Services
CMI Healthcare Services
Community Alliance for the Homeless
Door of Hope
Dorothy Day House
Grady Chapel CME Church
The Hagar Center, Inc.
Homes for Hearts
H.O.P.E.
Hope House
Housing the Homeless – HELPS
The Independent Parent Inc.
Judicare

A Lee Dog Story
Lisieux Community
Memphis Dream Center
Memphis Health Center
Merge Memphis
Meritan
Metropolitan Inter-Faith Association (MIFA)
OUTMemphis
Peanut’s House, Inc.
Promise Development Corporation
Refuge Memphis
Restoration Time Family & Youth Services
Room in the Inn-Memphis
Seed House Inc
SHIELD, Inc.
St. John’s Community Services (SJCS)
St. Luke Lutheran Church
St. Matthew’s United Methodist Church
Thistle and Bee Enterprises Inc.
Trinity Community Coalition Outreach, Inc.
We Are Family CDC

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 3

Table of Contents

Introduction

4

Approval and Annual Review

6

Outline: Goals, Objectives, Strategies, and Benchmarks

7

Narratives

Goal 1: Ensure Homelessness is a Rare Experience 12

Goal 2: Ensure Homelessness is a Brief Experience 14

Goal 3: Ensure Homelessness is a One-Time Experience 18

Goal 4: Sustain an End to Homelessness 20

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 4

Introduction

The Memphis/Shelby County Homeless Consortium is the voluntary association that

provides leadership, services, advocacy, and information related to Memphis and Shelby

County’s homeless population. The mission of the Consortium is to develop, sustain and

coordinate a comprehensive continuum of care for citizens of the City of Memphis and Shelby

County who experience homelessness in order to establish pathways to self-sufficiency and

ultimately to eliminate homelessness.

The Consortium has active members from many different sectors across Memphis and Shelby

County including housing and service providers, local government, churches and faith-based

organizations, mental health organizations, affordable housing developers, educational

systems, medical providers, and advocates. The Consortium meets quarterly, and has several

open committees and working groups that meet more regularly and focus on specific

populations or services provided by member agencies.

The Consortium serves as the TN-501: Memphis/Shelby County Continuum of Care (CoC),

designated by HUD as the group organized to carry out the responsibilities prescribed in the

HEARTH Act for a defined geographic area. Responsibilities of the group include planning for,

designating, and operating the CoC, designating and operating an HMIS (Homeless

Management Information System), and designing and implementing the process associated

with applying for CoC Program funds.

The Governing Council (the decision-making body of the Consortium) currently designates

Community Alliance for the Homeless (CAFTH) to serve as the lead agency for the CoC.

CAFTH provides staff support for the Consortium and its committees and is assigned other CoC

duties, including serving as the HMIS Lead Agency and the Collaborative Applicant for agencies

to receive CoC Program funds from HUD.

In January 2011, a 10-year Action Plan to End Homelessness was presented by the Mayors’

Committee to End Homelessness, co-chaired by former City of Memphis Mayor A C Wharton

and former Shelby County Mayor Mark Luttrell. Community Alliance for the Homeless (CAFTH)

was identified as the agency to carry out the Action Plan.

In Memphis/Shelby County, since the introduction of the 2011 Action Plan, the

total number of:

● Individuals experiencing homelessness has fallen by 47%, from 1,942 to 1,0221

● Permanent supportive housing beds has risen by 141%, from 546 to 1,3162

● Rapid rehousing beds has risen by 185%, from 163 to 465

● Temporary transitional housing beds has fallen by 61%, from 1,399 to 543

1 https://files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC_PopSub_CoC_TN-501-2011_TN_2011
2 https://files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC_HIC_CoC_TN-501-2011_TN_2011

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 5

In the same time, the total annual Continuum of Care (CoC) program funding awarded to

agencies in Memphis/Shelby County has risen by 23%, from $5.6 million to $6.9 million.

Due to the expiration of the 2011 Action Plan in 2020, Community Alliance for the Homeless

(CAFTH) was tasked with drafting a new strategic plan to continue the success seen since 2011

and ultimately end homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County. Although the COVID-19

pandemic beginning in March 2020 dramatically altered and delayed original plans for

developing the strategic plan, community feedback and strategizing continued after the

immediate response passed.

The following strategic plan follows the structure of the Home, Together: Federal Strategic

Plan

to Prevent and End Homelessness released by the United States Interagency Council on

Homelessness (USICH) in 2018. The Home, Together Federal plan emphasizes evidence-

based and proven strategies to end homelessness; the federal plan has been tailored to fit the

local context and needs in Memphis/Shelby County.

A draft of the plan outline was presented at the September 2020 Memphis/Shelby County

Homeless Consortium quarterly virtual meeting and feedback was requested from attendees.

After the meeting, a recording of the presentation of the draft outline was also sent to all

individuals on the CAFTH/Consortium mailing list. Feedback was received from 13 individuals

and was integrated into the next draft. This draft was again sent to all individuals on the

CAFTH/Consortium mailing list with a request for additional feedback. Substantive feedback

was received from one agency.

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 6

Approval and Annual Review

After the second round of community and provider feedback, the draft plan was presented to

representatives of the City of Memphis and Shelby County for review and to the

Memphis/Shelby County Homeless Consortium Governing Council for final approval. The plan

was approved unanimously by the Governing Council on March 10, 2021.

The Strategic Plan will be reviewed at least annually by the Homeless Consortium’s Governing

Council. Community Alliance for the Homeless as the designated CoC Lead Agency will provide

reports on the plan’s progress along with this review process. The Strategic Plan may be

amended with a majority vote by the Governing Council.

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 7

Outline: Goals, Objectives, Strategies, and

Benchmarks

Goal 1: Ensure Homelessness is a Rare Experience

Objective 1.1: Collaboratively Build Lasting Systems that End

Homelessness

Strategies Benchmarks

1.1a: Work proactively with publicly funded
institutions and systems of care to develop
and implement discharge policies that help
prevent homelessness.

Formalize discharge planning with at least 2
systems of care (e.g. criminal justice, foster
care, hospital, and mental health) to ensure
as many individuals as possible are not
exited from these systems directly into
homelessness, or if unavoidable are
connected with supports and resources

1.1b: Improve data sharing agreements Develop data sharing agreements and
conduct regular data imports or direct data
entry with at least 2 external partners not
currently entering data into HMIS

Objective 1.2: Increase Capacity and Strengthen Practices to Prevent Housing Crises

and Homelessness

Strategies Benchmarks

1.2a: Increase funding and resources for
prevention and diversion activities

Develop and formalize an official diversion
plan within the CoC including plans for
ongoing prevention and diversion funding
sources

1.2b: Increase resources and policies to
support vulnerable populations including
youth, families, domestic violence survivors,
and veterans

Formalize lead partners for assisting each
population and track progress towards
meeting USICH benchmarks for ending
homelessness for these populations

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 8

Goal 2: Ensure Homelessness is a Brief Experience

Objective 2.1: Identify and Engage All People Experiencing Homelessness as Quickly

as Possible

Strategies Benchmarks

2.1a: Increase street outreach and service

coordination programs that allow persons to

access needed services quickly and

efficiently

Formalize processes surrounding

assessment, intake, and diversion for both

internal and external CoC agencies, including

policies for those who are fleeing domestic

violence

Formalize and expand additional entry points

into system, especially outside of traditional

operating hours

Assess outreach needs and formalize plan for

expanding outreach funding and capacity,

including activating an outreach committee to

develop plan and further

goals

Objective 2.2: Provide Immediate Access to Low-Barrier Emergency Shelter or other

Temporary Accommodations to All Who Need it

Strategies Benchmarks

2.2a: Increase Emergency Shelter with an

emphasis on free, low-barrier, equal access

shelters

Better track unsheltered populations to

determine needs and formalize plan for

expanding shelter funding and capacity,

including by reducing overall length of time

homeless and increasing exits to permanent

housing

Educate and partner with existing shelters to

lower barriers as much as possible and

expand capacity

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 9

Objective 2.3: Maintain Coordinated Entry System (CES) to Standardize Assessment

and Prioritization Processes and Streamline Connections to Housing

and Services

Strategies Benchmarks

2.3a: Expand CES partnerships to increase

and improve entry and exit points and better

connect community partners

Formalize partnerships with at least 2

emergency shelters for single adults outside

of the current CES to expand intake capacity

Formalize process for referring individuals to

services while they await housing, including

outreach, housing navigation, and mental

health or substance abuse resources for

those who want

them

Objective 2.4: Assist People to Move Swiftly into Permanent Housing with Appropriate

and Person-Centered Services

Strategies Benchmarks

2.4a: Increase and Maximize Permanent

Housing Resources

Develop and formalize a plan to both increase

utilization rates of current permanent housing

beds and expand permanent housing

capacity, including ways to visualize data on

permanent housing capacity and availability

Develop landlord engagement strategy to

better partner with flexible and low-barrier

private market landlords

Formalize partnerships with at least 2

affordable housing providers outside of the

current CES to expand outflow capacity

2.4b: Provide Training on Permanent

Supportive Housing (PSH) and Rapid

Rehousing (RRH) principles to ensure case

managers and housing staff are fully trained

on supportive housing services

Develop and formalize new plan and

requirements for training new CoC PSH and

RRH case managers as well as recurring

training and testing to ensure cohesive

training across the CoC

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 10

Goal 3: Ensure Homelessness is a One-Time Experience

Objective 3.1: Prevent Returns to Homelessness through Connections to Adequate

Services and Opportunities

Strategies Benchmarks

3.1a: Seek and design partnerships with key

mainstream service providers to leverage

resources and support integrated care

Improve and formalize referral processes

between housing providers and mainstream

benefit resources, including mental health

resources for those who need them

Objective 3.2: Increase Opportunities for Meaningful Engagement with Persons with

Lived Experiences

Strategies Benchmarks

3.2a: Formalize feedback from persons with

lived experience, through either focus groups

or feedback more routinely collected from

clients in existing programs

Develop and formalize a policy to create a

Lived Experience Advisory Group within the

Homeless Consortium

Expand Consortium’s Governing Council to

include additional spots for individuals with

lived experience of homelessness

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 11

Goal 4: Sustain an End to Homelessness

Objective 4.1: Sustain Practices and Systems at a Scale Necessary to Respond to

Future Needs

Strategies Benchmarks

4.1a: Broaden understanding around states

of housing insecurity that may factor into

future homelessness

Outline goals for meeting a functional zero

end to homelessness and how to measure

data to ensure that goal can be met in a

sustained manner

Objective 4.2: Planning for the Needs of Persons Experiencing Homelessness in

Disaster Response and Recovery Efforts

Strategies Benchmarks

4.2a: Addressing Response and Recovery

From COVID-19 Pandemic

During and after COVID-19 response,

develop report on lessons learned and

strategies to improve future emergency

response efforts

4.2b: Adaptable Emergency Response
Planning for Persons Experiencing
Homelessness

Develop and formalize Emergency Response

Plan

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 12

Narratives

Goal 1: Ensure Homelessness is a Rare Experience

Memphis and Shelby County will work to ensure homelessness is a rare experience by

implementing strategies to build lasting systems to support those experiencing homelessness

and increase resources aimed at preventing persons from becoming homeless. This includes

strategies for building strong local systems, expanding partnerships with mainstream programs

that are not specifically targeted to people experiencing homelessness, putting a greater

emphasis on diversion strategies, and strengthening our ability to prevent housing crises and

homelessness. Implementation of these strategies will be grounded in data and analysis and will

support our community to address the needs of populations that are disproportionately impacted

by homelessness.

Objective 1.1: Collaboratively Build Lasting Systems that End Homelessness

To achieve the goal of ending homelessness and to ensure that homelessness is a rare

experience, it is important to ensure that a variety of homeless providers, governmental entities,

and community agencies are represented in system planning. Bringing together key

stakeholders to help build a collaborative response to ending homelessness allows for multiple

systems that engage with persons experiencing homelessness to be at the decision making

table.

Strategy 1.1a: Work proactively with publicly funded institutions and systems of care to

develop and implement discharge policies that help prevent homelessness.

Memphis and Shelby County will create formal discharge policies with institutions of care,

correctional facilities, and other systems that may discharge individuals into homelessness or

housing instability. These discharge policies will highlight procedures for connecting persons

exiting an institution with no housing resources with the Coordinated Entry System, emergency

shelter resources, and permanent housing resources to ensure that persons are not exiting to

the street or unstable housing situations.

● Benchmark: Formalize discharge planning with at least 2 systems of care (e.g. criminal

justice, foster care, hospital, and mental health) to ensure as many individuals as

possible are not exited from these systems directly into homelessness, or if unavoidable

are connected with supports and resources

○ Potential funding: CoC Planning, ESG

Strategy 1.1b: Improve data sharing agreements.

Utilizing data systems such as HMIS is also needed to ensure that accurate data is collected on

persons experiencing homelessness and to help identify and track a person’s progression

through the homeless services system.

● Benchmark: Develop data sharing agreements and conduct regular data imports or

direct data entry with at least 2 external partners not currently entering data into HMIS

○ Potential funding: CoC HMIS, ESG HMIS

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 13

Objective 1.2: Increase Capacity and Strengthen Practices to Prevent Housing

Crises and Homelessness

In Memphis/Shelby County and across the country, few resources currently exist to prevent

housing crises and homelessness, and the resources that do exist are not adequate to meet the

demand. Expanding and supporting individuals, families, and specific populations at risk of

becoming homeless will help ensure that the homeless services system is not further strained.

Strategy 1.2a: Increase funding and resources for prevention and diversion activities

To ensure that homelessness is a rare occurrence, funding for prevention activities is needed to

allow for resources that can help prevent persons from being evicted into homelessness. These

funds should include flexibility for one-time rental payments to prevent evictions, landlord

mitigation, repairs for cars to prevent the loss of a job, and other services that can help keep

someone from losing their homes or ending up experiencing homelessness. Homelessness

prevention should not be the responsibility of the homelessness crisis response system alone.

Rather, it requires a multi-sector approach and an active focus on housing needs, housing

stability, and risks of homelessness across many different public systems. Effective prevention

approaches must include enhanced cross-system collaboration, such as increased awareness

and attentiveness to housing stability, and effective transition and/or discharge planning that link

people to other resources, including employment and other economic mobility supports, to

reduce the risk of homelessness upon discharge or following the end of service provision.

● Benchmark: Develop and formalize an official diversion plan within the CoC including

plans for ongoing prevention and diversion funding sources

○ Potential funding: ESG, CDBG, private funding

Strategy 1.2b: Increase resources and policies to support vulnerable populations

including youth, families, domestic violence survivors, and veterans

While experiencing homelessness places all people at an increased state of vulnerability, there

are additional subpopulations that are at a higher risk of becoming homeless and continued

homelessness, violence, exploitation, and more. Increasing the capacity of systems to meet the

unique needs of youth ages 18-24, especially those in the LGBTQ community, persons fleeing

domestic violence, families, and veterans includes collaborating with systems that serve these

populations that may not be directly involved in the homelessness sector.

● Benchmark: Formalize lead partners for assisting each population and track progress

towards meeting USICH benchmarks for ending homelessness for these populations

○ Potential funding: CoC Planning

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 14

Goal 2: Ensure Homelessness is a Brief Experience

This goal focuses on the understanding that even with effective systems in place, there is still

the possibility that persons may find themselves in a situation where they are experiencing

homelessness. Memphis and Shelby County will work to establish effective practices that are

able to quickly identify those experiencing literal homelessness and connect them with the

resources needed to get them into shelter, referred to permanent housing options, and linked to

supportive services that will allow them to succeed in housing. Strategies focus especially on

coordinated and comprehensive outreach, low-barrier emergency shelter, strong coordinated

entry processes, and swift connections to different forms of permanent housing. Housing First

practices will be central focuses of each objective within this goal and within all practices of the

homelessness response system.

Objective 2.1: Identify and Engage All People Experiencing Homelessness as

Quickly as Possible

It is important to quickly identify and engage individuals and families when they do fall into

homelessness—including sheltered and unsheltered homelessness in locations such as cars,

parks, abandoned buildings, encampments, or on the street—to ensure that experience is brief.

Memphis and Shelby County will utilize the Continuum of Care’s Coordinated Entry System to

provide coordinated, housing-focused outreach to identify and engage individuals and families

experiencing homelessness.

Strategy 2.1a: Increase street outreach and service coordination programs that allow

persons to access needed services quickly and efficiently

Expanding outreach staff and services is needed to better identify and engage with persons who

are currently experiencing homelessness in the community. Effective and coordinated outreach

allows for clients to be educated on resources available to them, have someone who can help

them work through what their needs and preferences are for services, and establish a

communication link between clients and housing providers/supportive services. Building trust

and a communication path for persons experiencing homelessness are essential for ensuring

that persons can be identified quickly and have a clear understanding of how to connect to the

resources they need.

● Benchmark: Formalize processes surrounding assessment, intake, and diversion for

both internal and external CoC agencies, including policies for those who are fleeing

domestic violence

○ Potential funding: ESG

● Benchmark: Formalize and expand additional entry points into system, especially

outside of traditional operating hours

○ Potential funding: ESG, CDBG

● Benchmark: Assess outreach needs and formalize plan for expanding outreach funding

and capacity, including activating an outreach committee to develop plans and further

goals

○ Potential funding: ESG

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 15

Objective 2.2: Provide Immediate Access to Low-Barrier Emergency Shelter or

other Temporary Accommodations to All Who Need it

An effective crisis response system helps individuals and families experiencing homelessness

avoid the need to enter emergency shelter whenever possible. It is also able to immediately

provide high-quality, housing-focused shelter or other temporary accommodations for those

living in unsafe situations, including those fleeing domestic violence and human trafficking and

those living in unsheltered locations. Memphis and Shelby County will establish effective models

of emergency shelter and other temporary accommodations available that:

● Meet the needs of all members of a household and self-defined family and kinship

groups, including infants and young children;

● Do not turn people away or make access contingent on sobriety, minimum income

requirements, or lack of a criminal history;

● Do not require family members and partners to separate from one another in order to

access shelter;

● Ensure that policies and procedures promote dignity and respect for every person

seeking or needing shelter and follow equal access laws; and

● Provide a free, safe, decent, welcoming, and appropriate temporary living environment,

where daily needs can be met while pathways back to safe living arrangements or

directly into housing programs are being pursued.

Strategy 2.2a: Increase Emergency Shelter with an emphasis on free, low-barrier, equal

access shelters

Currently, low-barrier access to shelters is limited in Memphis and Shelby County. To ensure

that persons in need of emergency shelter are able to access shelter that can also coordinate

effectively with the Coordinated Entry System to provide supportive services needed to exit to

permanent housing, Memphis and Shelby County will work to expand the number of emergency

shelter beds that are free, low-barrier, and follow equal access requirements.

● Benchmark: Better track unsheltered populations to determine needs and formalize

plan for expanding shelter funding and capacity, including by reducing overall length of

time homeless and increasing exits to permanent housing

○ Potential funding: ESG

● Benchmark: Educate and partner with existing shelters to lower barriers as much as

possible and expand capacity

○ Potential funding: ESG

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 16

Objective 2.3: Maintain Coordinated Entry System (CES) to Standardize

Assessment and Prioritization Processes and Streamline Connections to Housing

and Services

Coordinated entry processes make it possible for people experiencing or at risk of experiencing

homelessness to have their strengths and needs quickly assessed, and to be swiftly connected

to appropriate, tailored housing and services within the community or designated region.

Memphis and Shelby County will continue to utilize standardized assessment tools, prioritization

policies, and practices that take into account the unique needs of different populations, including

parents, infants and young children, youth, people with disabilities, people living with HIV/AIDS,

survivors of domestic violence, and populations that are disproportionately represented among

people experiencing homelessness. The Coordinated Entry System (CES) ensures the most

intensive interventions are prioritized for those with the highest needs, as identified by the

community.

Strategy 2.3a: Expand CES partnerships to increase and improve entry and exit points

and better connect community partners

Emergency shelters should be better integrated into the Coordinated Entry System to ensure

that persons accessing shelter and are seeking housing resources are quickly assessed for

vulnerability and added to the queue for permanent housing opportunities. This will help to

ensure that persons are quickly linked with resources and supportive services needed to help

them exit homelessness.

● Benchmark: Formalize partnerships with at least 2 emergency shelters for single adults

outside of the current CES to expand intake capacity

○ Potential funding: ESG

● Benchmark: Formalize process for referring individuals to services while they await

housing, including outreach, housing navigation, and mental health or substance abuse

resources for those who want them

○ Potential funding: ESG

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 17

Objective 2.4: Assist People to Move Swiftly into Permanent Housing with

Appropriate and Person-Centered Services

To end homelessness as quickly and efficiently as possible, our community must focus on

streamlining connections to permanent housing and providing people with the appropriate level

of services to support their long-term housing stability. Memphis and Shelby County will work to

remove as many obstacles and unnecessary requirements as possible in order to expedite

people’s access to stable housing. Effective Housing First approaches at the center of moving

people to permanent housing quickly, developed in response to strong evidence, include:

● expanding access to new and existing affordable housing for people experiencing

homelessness;

● providing rapid re-housing to families and individuals;

● and providing supportive housing to people with the highest needs.

Strategy 2.4a: Increase and Maximize Permanent Housing Resources

While progress has been made to increase permanent housing options in the community, there

is still a need for more Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) units for chronically homeless

individuals and additional funding for Rapid Rehousing (RRH) programs to help quickly get

people back into housing they can sustain on their own. Increasing the capacity to assist

individuals in need of these housing resources will allow the community to decrease the number

of people currently experiencing homelessness and help to provide the supportive services

needed to keep people in

housing.

● Benchmark: Develop and formalize a plan to both increase utilization rates of current

permanent housing beds and expand permanent housing capacity, including ways to

visualize data on permanent housing capacity and availability

○ Potential funding: CoC

● Benchmark: Develop landlord engagement strategy to better partner with flexible and

low-barrier private market landlords

○ Potential funding: CoC, private funding

● Benchmark: Formalize partnerships with at least 2 affordable housing providers outside

of the current CES to expand outflow capacity

○ Potential funding: HOME, CDBG, LIHTC

Strategy 2.4b: Provide Training on Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) and Rapid

Rehousing (RRH) principles to ensure case managers and housing staff are fully trained

on supportive housing services

All staff that work within the Coordinated Entry System, along with community partners who

serve persons experiencing homelessness, will receive training on supportive housing and

Housing First principles. Proper training helps make sure that case management and supportive

services are centered around how to best help a client find and maintain housing, while also

educating those that interact with the homeless system about best practices for housing.

● Benchmark: Develop and formalize new plan and requirements for training new CoC

PSH and RRH case managers as well as recurring training and testing to ensure

cohesive training across the CoC

○ Potential funding: CoC Planning

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 18

Goal 3: Ensure Homelessness is a One-Time Experience

This goal focuses on ensuring that people exit to permanent housing stably and successfully,

using housing as a platform for accessing essential services and connecting people to the

opportunities they need. Strategies employed by Memphis and Shelby County will emphasize

strengthening the quality of housing and services interventions and provide connections to other

resources and opportunities, such as education, benefits, and employment, that can help people

find lasting success.

Objective 3.1: Prevent Returns to Homelessness through Connections to

Adequate Services and Opportunities

To ensure that individuals and families don’t fall back into homelessness, it is necessary to

strengthen partnerships with, and connections to, a larger array of federal, state, local, and

private programs that serve low-income households, including programs that: advance

education and employment opportunities and support upward economic mobility; provide

connections to health and behavioral health care services; and link people to a range of other

programs and systems that support strong and thriving communities, such as quality child care,

schools, family support networks, and other resources. Memphis and Shelby County will

continue to solicit new members to the Memphis/Shelby County Homeless Consortium from

diverse agencies that serve persons that are experiencing homelessness or low income

persons that are at a higher risk of facing housing instability.

Strategy 3.1a: Seek and design partnerships with key mainstream service providers to

leverage resources and support integrated care

Memphis and Shelby County will work to ensure formal partnerships with key mainstream

providers are established that can help provide access to benefits, mental health/substance

abuse resources, and employment agencies. These partnerships are key to help persons

experiencing homelessness access resources and supportive services needed to increase

income, access resources to help with mental health and substance abuse issues, and maintain

housing.

● Benchmark: Improve and formalize referral processes between housing providers and

mainstream benefit resources, including mental health resources for those who need

them

○ Potential funding: ESG

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 19

Objective 3.2: Increase Opportunities for Meaningful Engagement with Persons

with Lived Experiences

Memphis and Shelby County will work to ensure that individuals and families who have

experienced homelessness are active and engaged partners in the system planning process.

Those with lived experience of homelessness have a strong understanding and expertise in the

current gaps of the system and best solutions.

Strategy 3.2a: Formalize feedback from persons with lived experience, through either

focus groups or feedback more routinely collected from clients in existing programs

Formalizing the Consortium’s structure to include more opportunities for individuals with lived

experience of homelessness to participate in decision-making processes will expand

perspectives and strengthen the work of the Consortium.

● Benchmark: Develop and formalize a policy to create a Lived Experience Advisory

Group within the Homeless Consortium

○ Potential funding: CoC Planning

● Benchmark: Expand Consortium’s Governing Council to include additional spots for

individuals with lived experience of homelessness

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 20

Goal 4: Sustain an End to Homelessness

Memphis and Shelby County understands the importance of tracking and measuring key data

points routinely, projecting and responding to future needs, and implementing continuous quality

improvement efforts in the role of sustaining an end to homelessness. HMIS will continue to be

a key data tool utilized by providers within the CoC and to track and report on data collected on

the population of persons experiencing homelessness. Accurate data tracking will help to

understand the current and potential future needs for sustainable permanent supportive housing

resources in the community, and will help in evaluation efforts to see the success the

community has had at ending and maintaining an end to homelessness. Quality data will also

help to leverage additional funding, understand what program types and interventions are most

successful, and allow continuous improvement efforts to be implemented from evaluation

results.

Objective 4.1: Sustain Practices and Systems at a Scale Necessary to Respond to

Future Needs

In order to sustain the successes implemented in previous goals, Memphis and Shelby County

will monitor outcomes and returns to homelessness to ensure that adequate investments into

the crisis response system and into permanent housing interventions are sustained to address

future needs. Efforts will also be made to continually learn from other communities that have

successfully met goals for ending homelessness to ensure that the most up to date information

and strategies for success are considered and implemented within the community.

Strategy 4.1a: Broaden understanding around states of housing insecurity that may

factor into future homelessness

Monitoring and understanding different states of ongoing housing insecurity in Memphis/Shelby

County, especially for specific populations identified as being at higher risk of becoming

homeless or returning to homelessness, will be an important tool in planning for potential future

system needs.

● Benchmark: Outline goals for meeting a functional zero end to homelessness and how

to measure data to ensure that goal can be met in a sustained manner

○ Potential funding: CoC Planning

901 Home, Together: Strategic Plan to End Homelessness in Memphis/Shelby County 21

Objective 4.2: Planning for the Needs of Persons Experiencing Homelessness in

Disaster Response and Recovery Efforts

To ensure that emergency events that may happen to do not disproportionately impact persons

experiencing homelessness, planning for response and recovery must include this population.

Collaboration and coordination with emergency response partners, local governmental

agencies, and community partners is essential to ensure that persons experiencing

homelessness can access emergency services and be connected efficiently with the CoC from

emergency partners.

Strategy 4.2a: Addressing Response and Recovery From COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 Pandemic, which began in March of 2020, caused persons experiencing

homelessness to have limited access to basic hygiene care and low-density shelter. These

factors, along with a higher prevalence that persons experiencing homelessness, especially

unsheltered homelessness, often have pre-existing conditions, placed them more at risk for

contracting COVID and having severe symptoms from the virus.

● Benchmark: During and after COVID-19 response, develop report on lessons learned

and strategies to improve future emergency response efforts

○ Potential funding: CoC Planning

Strategy 4.2b: Adaptable Emergency Response Planning for Persons Experiencing

Homelessness

To create a sustainable plan for future potential emergencies or disasters, the CoC will work to

expand partnerships in the emergency management field and ensure the needs of people

experiencing homelessness are included in emergency response plans.

● Benchmark: Develop and formalize Emergency Response Plan

○ Potential funding: CoC Planning

Introduction

Approval and Annual Review

Outline: Goals, Objectives, Strategies, and Benchmarks

Narratives

Goal 1: Ensure Homelessness is a Rare Experience

Goal 2: Ensure Homelessness is a Brief Experience

Goal 3: Ensure Homelessness is a One-Time Experience

Goal 4: Sustain an End to Homelessness